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ABSTRACT
Online platforms provide unprecedented opportunities to nudge pro-social behav-
iors: They track and host fine-granularity data generated by real-world users, which
is a gold mine to understanding and modeling user behaviors. These interactive
interfaces and rich functionalities provide excellent flexibility in implementing and
delivering the nudge to the users. How shall we unleash the full potential of these
platforms to nudge pro-social behaviors?
In this dissertation, we propose an end-to-end data science pipeline that consists
of three closely coupled stages: We first analyze user-behaviors with empirical data to
discover potential nudges. We then develop recommender systems that maximize the
effectiveness of the nudge with personalization. Finally, we implement the nudge in
its original context and evaluate the nudge with randomized field experiments. Each
stage of the pipeline calls for joint efforts from multiple disciplines, especially causal
inference and machine learning. Moreover, the pipeline provides great flexibility for
researchers to initiate their research, and make use of the latest development in causal
inference and machine learning.
We present three empirical studies conducted in distinct application contexts: an
open-source software platform, an online microlending website, and a ride-sharing
application. While they each start at a different stage along the pipeline, collectively,
however, they demonstrate the effectiveness and flexibility of the proposed end-to-end




In his book Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness,
Nobel Prize winner Richard Thaylor introduces the concept nudge as a behavioral
mechanism that “alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding
any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” The interventions
are usually cheap and easy, but the achieved difference in people’s behavior can be
huge. In some of the most prominent applications, nudge practitioners changed the
“default choice” and designed better-structured options, which successfully nudged
participants to increase retirement savings, opt-in for organ donation, and make other
pro-social choices.
Can we design better nudges, especially now that so-called “big-data” is deeply in-
terwoven into our daily lives? In fact, many of our choices are already “data-driven,”
whether intentionally or not. Intentionally, we ask our phones about the weather,
we search Google for answers, and we browse the product reviews. Unintentionally,
however, many of our behaviors are actually shaped by data science algorithms, es-
pecially when we are interacting with online platforms. News websites, social media
applications, and e-commerce platforms determine which headlines they want us to
read, which news feed they want us to view, and which products they want us to
shop, all in data-driven approaches, personalized through recommender systems or
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other filtering algorithms. And they have proven the effectiveness of this approach
with their considerable revenue outcomes.
In observing the great potential of nudges in improving societal benefits, and the
great success of data-driven business applications, this dissertation considers how
might we unleash the power of data science to provide better nudges for pro-social
behaviors. Or, more specifically, it asks can we use data science to better nudge
pro-social behaviors?
Indeed, online platforms have provided us unprecedented opportunities for the
nudge, with three highlights: First, online social media and web-based applications
track and host fine-granularity data generated by real-world users. And the recently
developed data mining algorithms and machine learning models provide tools to pro-
cess and make sense of the data. Second, nudge theory’s core concept is choice
architecture, which refers to the context in which people make decisions. This par-
ticular term is in perfect analogy to the idea of recommender systems on the online
platforms, which, in a general sense, are designed to facilitate users making choices.
Lastly, interactive interfaces and rich functionalities make online platforms an ideal
place to implement and deliver nudges to users.
1.1 Overview of an End-to-End Data Science Pipeline
With these three factors combined, we propose an end-to-end data science pipeline
to identify, implement, and evaluate nudges that promote pro-social behaviors. As
illustrated in Figure 1.1, such a pipeline consists of three critical stages:
Empirical data analysis We start by analyzing empirical data generated by people
in real-world contexts. The goal of this stage is to reveal causal insights from
user behavior data and identify potential “nudges” that may lead to data-driven
solutions.
2
Figure 1.1: The End-to-End Data Science Pipeline
Recommender system As the second step, we design recommender systems that
provide personalized suggestions for people to take action. The recommenda-
tions are personalized so as to maximize the nudging effect in changing people’s
behaviors.
Field experiment Finally, we implement and evaluate recommender systems. Note
that it is best to deploy such systems in the original context, in order to demon-
strate the effectiveness of the data-driven nudge in real-world scenarios.
These three stages comprise an end-to-end data science pipeline, with human-
generated data on one end, and the change of human behaviors on the other. Note
that the pipeline is not merely combining three separate types of data science ap-
plications. Instead, the three stages are closely knitted together and span the entire
lifecycle of data, in which the output from upstream stages serves as input for down-
stream stages.
1.1.1 Challenges and Opportunities in each Stage
The connection between different stages goes even beyond the input-output cou-
pling. In fact, we have to “re-purpose” the objectives of individual stages in order
to build such an end-to-end pipeline. This gives rise to a series of challenges that
call for interdisciplinary responses. As a result, this approach provides a principled
3
framework that unifies efforts across different literature, even as it advances each
component of the pipeline in new directions.
In this section, we re-examine each stage, highlighting challenges and opportunities
separately:
Our first stage relies on a causal inference to draw causal conclusions from observed
data, yet it is hard to apply such techniques directly when the data are massive, het-
erogeneous, and even unstructured. This challenge is to be addressed by developing
new methodologies to conduct causal inference with machine learning algorithms. In-
deed, researchers in computational social science are applying large-scale data analysis
techniques to study problems with social, political, and policy implications. Many
studies in this field derive causal conclusions, which work well as the first stage in
our pipeline. In return, the pipeline allows downstream stages to turn the causal
conclusions into actions, which can significantly increase the applicable value of the
conclusions.
Machine learning has been widely used in developing recommender systems, which
are optimized to predict user choices. To adopt a recommender system as the sec-
ond stage of the pipeline, however, we need to change the optimization goal of the
recommender system to optimize the treatment effect. That is, we want the recom-
mender system to suggest personalized treatments that are most effective in nudging
pro-social behaviors. Recently, researchers in the reinforcement learning and rec-
ommender system area are paying increasing attention to estimating heterogeneous
treatment effects through “counterfactual learning” and learning optimal policy func-
tions based on observed data. These studies closely resemble the second stage in our
pipeline, especially if the objective of the policy is to maximize the “change” in users’
adopted behavior. In return, the first stage of our pipeline can provide domain knowl-
edge and theoretical guidance to improve policy learning. Also, the overall context of
nudging pro-social behaviors can help the developed methodologies achieve a greater
4
societal benefit.
The third stage in our pipeline is akin to the randomized field experiments used
by behavior economists and other empirical researchers to evaluate new programs or
policies. One common concern in field experiments is non-compliance among par-
ticipants. As the third stage of the pipeline, however, the concern can be eased as
the recommender system in the previous stage serve personalized treatments that are
predicted to increase compliance and maximize the treatment effect. Traditionally,
the analysis of randomized field experiments is focused on average treatment effect.
Yet the same concern of non-compliance also highlights the importance of analyzing
heterogeneous treatment effects.
The analysis of heterogeneous treatment effects calls for more sophisticated causal
inference tools, which we have highlighted as an important contribution of the first
stage. This implies that the pipeline is not a one-way street, but a loop.
1.1.2 Connecting End-to-End as a Loop
As we have seen, randomized field experiments are in need of advanced causal
inference techniques, which are developed in the first stage of the pipeline. In the
first stage, we want more empirical data to mine better nudges, but, if we treat
the experiment data as a new set of human-generated data and feed it into the
first stage, we can improve both stages at the same time. This essentially connects
the two ends of the data science pipeline to form a loop! This allows us to repeat
iterating the pipeline, each time with an updated collection of data, new insights
for designing nudges, better-personalized recommendations, and more effective nudge
implementation in the application.
Until now, illustrations of the data science pipeline always start with observed data
collections and end with a new set of user behavior data. For this reason, the looping
structure is a vast improvement, as it allows great flexibility in deciding where to start
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and end the loop. One may start with causal insights, such as insights from theory
or previous literature, that are not necessarily discovered through a first stage, and
proceed to develop recommender systems with machine learning algorisms. Instead
of data-driven recommender systems, one may also start with a variety of rule-based
recommender systems and conduct field experiments. If desired, one may decide to
later update recommender systems using the experimental data. Similarly, researchers
can choose to stop after one, two, or more stages depending on the intermediate
results or external collaborations without worrying about the study’s intactness. Such
flexibility is evidenced by the three research projects in this dissertation. Each of them
starts at a different stage in the pipeline.
Finally, we should note that the term “end-to-end” is different from the typical
machine learning literature definations. In the machine learning context, end-to-
end refers to models (especially deep neural network models) that directly transform
raw inputs (such as text and audio/video streams) into target output (prediction
labels, generated text) without explicitly specifying intermediate stages such as fea-
ture extraction, selection, and/or normalization. End-to-end machine learning models
emphasize the ability to encapsulate a series of representations and transformations
of intermediate data, once the input and output of a model are defined. However,
the end-to-end in our proposed data science pipeline goes beyond individual machine
learning models. Instead, it emphasizes how different data science methods, including
causal inference, recommender systems, and field experiments, can be joined to cover
the entire lifecycle of user-generated data and achieve pro-social benefits.
In addition, in our usage, end-to-end underlines the role of human participation in
the process. End-to-end machine learning tries to minimize human effort in the train-
ing process by eliminiting intermediate stages, so that only the raw input and target
output are required. Our proposed end-to-end pipeline, however, is designed with hu-
mans at the center. Input data is collected from humans in real-world settings, and
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the output of each stage includes insights of human behaviors and personalized treat-
ments. Finally, the success of the pipeline is also evaluated based on user behaviors
observed in their original settings.
1.1.3 Real-World Applications of the End-to-End Pipeline
In this dissertation, we present three research projects that employ the pipeline in
real-world applications with the goal of nudging pro-social behaviors. We can broadly
refer to pro-social behaviors as any social behaviors that benefit other people or soci-
ety as a whole. However, we bind the scope of this dissertation to pro-social behaviors
on online platforms, where data-driven approaches are most feasible. Further, we fo-
cus on online platforms where the participating and contributing behavior understood
to be pro-social. Note that we do not require such behaviors to be purely altruis-
tic. Indeed, the three platforms studied in this dissertation range from a non-profit
microlending website (Kiva, Chapter IV) to a commercial ride-sharing application
(DiDi, Chapter V).
A summary of the three projects and an outline of the dissertation follows.
1.2 Dissertation Outline
In Chapter II, we review preliminaries of the causal inference literature. A recur-
ring theme of our research is the interplay of causal inference and machine learning.
As introduced in §1.1.1, causal inference plays important roles across different stages
in our proposed pipeline, both in the experiment and non-experiment settings. Yet
our work extends beyond the classic causal inference literature, as the data involved
in the studies are massive, heterogeneous, and even unstructured, which are more eas-
ily handled with machine learning algorithms. In this chapter, we categorize causal
inference literature with identification strategies and highlight recent explorations in
bridging causal inference and machine learning.
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Chapters III to V introduce three research projects that apply the end-to-end
data science pipeline. On the surface, the three projects are independent of each
other: they are conducted in distinct application contexts: an open-source software
platform, an online microlending platform, and a ride-sharing platform; and they each
start at a different stage along the pipeline. Collectively, however, they demonstrate
the advantage and flexibility of the proposed end-to-end pipeline in promoting pro-
social behaviors.
In Chapter III, we study the usage of emojis on GitHub. GitHub is the largest
platform for open-source software development. A large proportion of conversations
on GitHub are organized through its issue tracking system. Adequate and timely
response to an issue is critical for the solution of the problem and the improvement
of the project. We would like to show that using emojis for issues on GitHub projects
attracts more attention from other developers, and leads to a faster resolving of the
issue. This study is aligned with the first stage in our pipeline. It joins recent
research on emoji usage on online platforms and is motivated by discussions of the
potential benefit of emojis as non-verbal cues in facilitating online communications.
By quantifying the effect of using emoji in online discussions, we identify a nudge
that can potentially promote pro-social behaviors. We do not address downstream
stages; however, a suitable response could include an emoji recommender system to
encourage the use of emojis.
In Chapter IV, we develop a team recommender system for lenders in Kiva.org
and evaluate it with a large-scale field experiment. Kiva is an online microlending
platform that connects citizen lenders with low-income entrepreneurs in developing
countries, and its continuing success relies on the active participation of its lenders.
We build upon the empirical evidence that team identity promotes contribution to the
public good, and leverage the power of machine learning to develop a recommender
system that predicts new team membership based on historical data. Through a
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large-scale field experiment, we show that team recommendations can be an effective
and low-cost behavioral mechanism to increase charitable contributions. This study
spans the second and third stages of the pipeline. A companion study, which also
studies team identity on Kiva.org, serves as the first stage for this study, as it reveales
the causal insights of leveraging social identity to promote lending. [32] Evaluating
recommender systems through a large-scale field experiment offers direct evidence of
the power of the end-to-end pipeline in promoting pro-social behaviors in the real
world.
In Chapter V, we examine the effect of team formation and inter-team contests on
the productivity of DiDi drivers through a large-scale field experiment. DiDi is the
dominant ride-sharing platform in China. Yet similar to other gig-economy platforms,
its workers often find themselves lonely and disengaged, citing a lack of work identity
and bonds with co-workers, which affects their productivity and their satisfaction with
the job. In this study, we randomly assign drivers to teams based on different team
formation strategies and have these teams compete for cash prizes. The experiment
results verify the effectiveness of the team contest in increasing driver productivity,
with a much larger effect for responsive teams. The results also suggest that the team
formation matters, as teams comprised of drivers from the same region are more
responsive and communicative within their team prior to the contest. Compared
with the previous two chapters, we do not have the empirical data to support causal
discoveries. Nor do we have behavior data to build a recommender system with
machine learning algorithms. Instead, we begin with the third stage in the end-to-end
pipeline. However, the data collected through the experiment enable us to learn the
effectiveness of different team formation strategies and extend a team recommender
system for further studies.




Preliminaries on Causal Inference
As we have seen in the introduction, causal inference plays several critical roles
in our proposed end-to-end data science pipepline. In the first stage, we need causal
inference to identify potential leverages that promote pro-social behavioral changes.
In the third stage, we rely on randomized experiments to evaluate their promotion.
Not only do we need properly designed randomized experiments, but we also them
rigorously analyzed in order to demostrate their effectiveness in nudging pro-social
behaviors, both of which demand guidance from causal inference literature.
However, our work extends beyond classic causal inference in that we are utiliz-
ing data of a much higher dimensionality. This explosion in dimensionality brings
challenges to causal inference techniques, but we believe that machine learning can
at least help alleviate such issues.
In this chapter, we review literature on causal inference. We mainly follow Rubin’s
potential outcome framework to set up causal inference problems, and categorize the
causal inference techniques based on their identification strategy. In particular, we
argue that our work is: (1) direct evidence (in that it reveals great potential) that
machine learning and causal inference can go hand in hand in achieving social impact;
(2) an exploration of how machine learning and causal inference can be combined;
and (3) indicative of the challenges to both machine learning and causal inference.
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As a final note, while there are other related literatures specific to individual
chapters and projects of the dissertation, such as literatures on emoji usage on social
media, social identity theory, and contest theory, we refer to them in their corre-
sponding chapters.
Before descussing different identification strategies, we begin with a review of
Rubin’s Potential Outcome Framework [64], also referred to as the Rubin Causal
Model. This establishes the notation for the remainder of the chapter.
2.1 Rubin Causal Model
The Rubin Causal Model has two key elements: potential outcomes and the as-
signment mechanism. We will start by defining the potential outcomes.
We use a binary random variable, di ∈ {0, 1}, to denote the treatment status of
the individual i. The individual is treated iff di = 1 and untreated iff di = 0. We
denote the outcome of the individual by yi. For each individual i, we also observe a
set of covariates, denoted as a covariate vector xi. The causal question of interest is
whether yi is affected by the treatment di.
To answer this question, we assume that we can imagine what the outcome might







i is the outcome had the individual not been treated,
regardless of his actual treatmment status, and y
(0)
i is the outcome if the individual
is treated.
In reality, we can only observe one of the two potential outcomes based on the





i di + y
(0)




i if di = 1
y
(0)
i if di = 0
. (2.1)
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The causal effect of the treatment on an individual, also referred to as individual






The econometric literature has usually focused on the average causal effect of the
treatment. If we average ITE over all individuals, we get the average treatment effect
(ATE):
ATE = E[y(1)i − y
(0)
i ]. (2.3)
Alternatively, if we average the treated individuals, we get the average treatment
effect on the treated (ATET, or ATT):
ATT = E[y(1)i − y
(0)
i | di = 1]. (2.4)
Recently, with the help of machine learning algorithms, researchers have been
giving increased attention to the heterogeneity in the treatment effect (with respect
to observed covariates), and studying the heterogeneous treatment effect (HTE) in
different subgroups of individuals [14].
Although we can observe the treatment an individual receives and the correspond-
ing outcome for that individual, we cannot observe outcome of treatment that the
individual does not receive, which is referred to as counterfactual outcome. There-
fore, we cannot directly observe the causal effect, which is called the “fundamental
problem of causal inference” [61]. Ultimately, causal effects can only be estimated by
comparing different individuals under different treatments.
Indeed, one may easily calculate the observed difference between treated and un-
12
treated individuals as E[yi|di = 1]− E[yi|di = 0], which can be rewritten as:
E[y(1)i | di = 1]− E[y
(0)
i | di = 0]
=(E[y(1)i | di = 1]− E[y
(0)
i | di = 1]) + (E[y
(0)
i | di = 1]− E[y
(0)
i | di = 0]).
(2.5)
The first term is the ATT defined in (2.4). However, the ATT differs from the
observed difference by E[y(0)i | di = 1] − E[y
(0)
i | di = 0]. This term captures the
difference in average y
(0)
i between the treated and untreated individuals, and is the
so-called selection bias.
The existence of selection bias hinders our ability to draw causal inference from
observational data. In economics, researchers have developed various strategies to
eliminate selection bias and identify causality. These strategies are frequently referred
to as identification strategies. Different identification strategies rely on different as-
sumptions of how treatment is assigned to each individual, namely the assignment
mechanism. This is usually characterized as a function of potential outcomes and
covariates. In general, assignment mechanism is divided into three classes. The first
class is to use randomized experiments; the second assumes unconfoundedness; and
the third includes all remaining mechanisms. We review identification strategies for
the three classes in subsequent sections.
2.2 Causal Inference with Randomized Experiment
Randomized experiments have been called the “gold standard” for establishing
causality. In a randomized experiment, some individuals are randomly selected to
receive treatment, while others remain untreated. The treatment assignment is inde-
pendent of potential outcomes. That is, we get E[y(0)i | di = 1] = E[y
(0)
i | di = 0]. In
this scenario, the selection bias term in (2.5) disappears, and the the observed mean
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difference between treatment and control groups is the unbiased estimate of the causal
effect. Besides completely randomized experiments, there are also variations on ran-
domization, such as stratified randomization and pairwise randomization [78]. But,
regardless of the randomization, the probability of assignment can still be described
as a function of the observed covariates and is independent of the outcomes.
Randomized experiments in evaluating programs have traditionally been rare [64],
due to the high cost of implementing the interventions and tracking the subjects be-
fore and after the intervention. The rise of online communities, however, presents a
practical and cost effective opportunity for conducting large-scale, randomized exper-
iments [35]. The Internet and web-based applications offer an extended collection of
technologies for intervention, such as sending emails or texts [32, 33], modifying web
interfaces or application fuctionalities [20, 19], and using bots or other automated
functionalities [41]. Sometimes it involves minimal collaboration with the site own-
ers. For example, experimenters can register as regular users and design interventions
without extra permissions or changes to the existing system [34, 32]. Alternatively,
researchers can collaborate with the site owner or even deploy their own sites. This
allows for more flexible intervention mechanisms and better access to data.
Although randomized experiments serve as the “gold standard” in testing causal-
ity, they do not guarantee that the correct causal effect is measured. We need to take
precautions to ensure the randomized experiments is identifying the desired causal
effect. One precaution is to design appropriate control conditions, which can be
challenging. Take the analogy of a medical experiment. We need to have a placebo
that resembles the stimulus except for the “hypothesized active ingredient.” Such a
placebo condition is also required for randomized experiments in other contexts.
The other precaution to be aware of is user’s noncompliance. That is, the users’
actual treatment status might be different from their assigned treatment status. In
such cases, we often need to analyze the experimental data with intend-to-treat (ITT)
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analysis, and report the local average treatment effect (LATE). See 2.4.1 for a related
discussion.
In sum, randomized experiments serve as a crucial step in our proposed pipeline.
In this dissertation, we run randomized experiments to verify the effectiveness of
the recommender system in changing users’ behaviors, and we do so by collaborat-
ing with industrial partners and implementing new functionalities on their platform.
The treatment we assign to each treated individual is personalized through the rec-
ommender system. We follow the literatures detailed above in taking all necessary
precautions to ensure correct identification. However, our work extends this research
by showing that such personalized treatment increases compliance.
2.3 Causal Inference under Unconfoundedness
In many cases, randomized experiments may not be an option, and we hope to de-
rive causal conclusions based on observational data. Luckily, there is mature literature
on estimating average treatment treatment effect if the unfoundedness assumption can
be justified.
Unfoundedness assumes that we can observe all the confounders, factors that are
associated with both the treatment assignment and the potential outcomes. There-
fore, we can assume that the treatment assignment is independent of the potential
outcomes conditional on observed confounders. This assumption is also referred to





i ) ⊥ di | xi. (2.6)
Under unfoundedness, the treatment assignment is “as good as” random, and the
observed difference between the treated and untreated individuals who share the
same values as the confounders can be interpreted as the causal effect [101]. In fact,
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randomized experiments can be regarded as a special case of unconfoundedness where
the treatment assignment is indeed random.
Note that the underlying presumption of “observing” any difference is that there
has to be at least one treated and one untreated individual. This requirement can be
written as:
0 < P(di = 1|xi = x) < 1 ∀x, (2.7)
and is called the “overlap” or “common support” assumption. It implies that the
support of the conditional distribution of xi given di = 1 overlaps with that of the
conditional distribution of xi given di = 0.
When the overlap assumption is satisfied, we can estimate the conditional average
treatment effect (CATE) as:
CATE(x) = E[y(1)i − y
(0)
i | xi = x]
= E[y(1)i | xi = x]− E[y
(0)
i | xi = x]
= E[y(1)i | xi = x, di = 1]− E[y
(0)
i | xi = x, di = 0]
= E[yi | xi = x, di = 1]− E[yi | xi = x, di = 0].
(2.8)
There are a variety of methods that aggregate CATE to derive the average treat-
ment effect, most of which use regression, matching, propensity score, or combinations
of these three methods.
Regression If we assume a linear relationship between the outcome and the co-
variate, that is, y
(0)
i = β0 + βxi + εi, the observed outcome can be writen as follows:
yi = di · y(1)i + (1− di) · y
(0)
i = di · [y(1) − y(0)] + y(0)
= di · ITEi + β0 + βxi + εi
(2.9)
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If we assume ITEi to be constant, that is ITEi = ATE for all i, we can fit a regression
model to estimate the average treatment effect. Despite the simplicity, however,
regressions come with a few caveats. First, regression assumes linearity, which may
lead to inconsistency if not hold. Although one can incorporate non-linear terms
into the regression formular, in general, it is hard to determine the right function
forms. Second, regression does not account for the covariate distributions of the
treated and untreated, and it will not indicate if there is no common support. This
may lead to a poor estimation of counterfactual outcomes [106]. Finally, regression
methods estimate ATE rather than ATT, but in many scenarios, ATT is a much more
interesting estimator than ATE.
Matching With (2.8), the treatment effect can easily be calculated by matching
treated and untreated individuals with the same covariate. In practice, however, the
overlapping assumption may not hold at every x, especially when the dimensionality
gets higher. This is known as the curse of dimensionality. As a result, many individ-
uals may not be matched with individuals of opposite treatment status. Therefore,
inexact matching is usually required instead of exact matching. With inexact match-
ing, we are estimating the term E[yi | xi = x, di = 0] in (2.8) as:




where w(i, j) is the weight of how the individual j contributes in constructing coun-
terfactual outcomes of i.
The most common way to do inexact matching is to define a similarity or distance
function and then match each treated individual to the nearest untreated individ-
ual(s), also known as nearest neighbor matching. In this case, w(i, j) = 1 if and only
if j is the closest untreated individual to i. Similarly, k-nearest neighbour matching
would mean w(i, j) = 1/k if j is among the k closest untreated individuals. Other
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inexact matching methods, such as kernal matching and local linear matching, can
also be specified with variations of w(i, j).
None of the matching methods can circumvent the common support assumption,
as it is always likely that some treated individuals are far from any untreated indi-
viduals. Unlike regression, however, matching can at least highlight common support
problems, and researchers can decide how to handled unmatched or ill-matched cases.
Instead of finding matches in the original high-dimensional space, an alternative
method estimates a propensity score for each representation and performs matchings
on the scores. Below, we first introduce propensity score and its properties, and then
discuss propensity score matching and other applications of propensity scores.
Propensity Score Propensity score is defined as the conditional probability of
being treated given the observed covariates. In notation, the propensity score, e(x),
can be written as:
e(x) = P (di = 1 | xi = x) = E[di | xi = x]. (2.11)
The simple way to estimate the propensity score is to compute the proportion of
treated individuals for each cell defined by the covariates. However, this can create
the same curse of dimensionality. In practice, the propensity score is usually estimated
using a parametric model, such as probit or logit regression.
[101] shows a nice property of the propensity score. That is, under unconfound-
edness, the independence of potential outcomes and treatment status still holds after
conditioning only on the propensity score. Mathematically,
di ⊥ (y(1)i , y
(0)




i ) | e(xi). (2.12)
Intuitively, this means that if the propensity score is correctly estimated, it should
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encapsulate all the information we needed from the covariates. For individuals of the
same (or similar) propensity score, the difference in observed outcomes comes solely
from differences in treatment. Therefore, we can match treated individuals with
untreated individuals who have similar propensity scores. This method is known as
propensity score matching (PSM). Similar to the more general matching introduced
above, there are many variations of propensity score matching. In addition to nearest
neighbour matching, we can also stratify the propensity score and match individuals
sharing the same stratum (also known as interval matching).
In addition to matching, there is also mature literature on using propensity scores
for weighting. We may rewrite 2.3 as:
ATE = E[y(1)i ]− E[y
(0)











That is, we can re-weight each individual by the inverse of such probability and the
difference between the weighted observations can be used to estimate the average
treatment effect. This method is referred to as inverse probability weighting (IPW).
In general, regression, matching, and propensity score based methods are the most
common tools in causal inference under unconfoundedness. It is also common to
combine different approaches in practice, for example, doubly robust estimators that
combines regression and propensity score methods have been proposed to increase
the robustness to misspecification of parametric models [100].
As indicated earlier, randomized experiments also satisfy the unconfoundedness
assumption. Therefore, the introduced methods – regression, matching, propensity
score – can also be used to analyze data collected from a randomized experiment. This
enables us to feed the output of the third stage into the first stage and transform our
end-to-end pipeline into a loop.
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Machine Learning “under Unconfoundedness” In recent years, more and
more attention has been paid to using machine learning to help causal inference [15];
a majority of these assume unfoundedness. One stream of such literature focuses on
the average treatment effect, where machine learning is mainly used to provide more
flexible control for a large number of covariates [22, 38]. Another stream focuses on
the heterogeneous treatment effect instead. Examples include [14, 115].
Alternatively, the causal inference techniques under confoundedness have also been
applied to improve machine learning systems, such as search engines, recommender
systems, and computational advertising [116, 82, 27]. Many such systems rely on
implicit feedback from users as signals for training and evaluation, while many biases
in human feedback need to be handled by causal inference models. A commonly
studied question is off-policy evaluation, that is, “how will the performance improve
if we change our system in this way.” Without A/B testing, this question requires
estimations which are “counterfactual” to what we can observe[117, 109]. This stream
of literature is often referred to as counterfactual machine learning. We point to
[68, 67] for more in-depth discussion.
Finally, a few impressions based on a preliminary review of these literature: The
most popular means to adapt machine learning for causal inference are Lasso and
Random Forest, while the most commonly borrowed causal inference techniques are
propensity score based methods, especially weighting. This is not surprising: As
a linear model, Lasso is not only simple, but also functions as a feature selection
tools to eliminate excessive number of features. However, Random Forest is better
at capturing non-linear interactions, and natually constructs partitions for matching.
On the other hand, (propensity) scoring and weighting are easier to incorporate into
existing machine learning models, and the estimation of scoring or weighting itself
can easily be cast as another prediction problem.
20
2.4 Other Identification Strategies
So far, the causal inference techniques discussed in this chapter are based on the
unconfoundedness assumption. In many scenarios, however, we cannot assume un-
confoundedness. That is, there is still dependence between the treatment assignment
and the potential outcomes conditioned on all observed confounders.
In such cases, none of the above methods can fully address the selection bias,
and there is no general solution. However, researchers have identified a few special
cases where solutions are available with additional assumptions. The most commonly
known approaches are instrumental variables, regression discontinuity, and difference-
in-differences.
2.4.1 Instrumental Variables
An instrumental variable, denoted as zi is a variable that satisfies two criteria:
Partial Correlation The instrumental variable is partially correlated with the causal
variable of interest, which is di in this case.
Exclusion Restriction The variable is not correlated with other determinants of
the outcomes. The intuition is that, zi is correlated to the outcome variable
only through its partial correlation with the treatment.
If both criteria are satisfied, one can use Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) to derive
an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect. Note that although the partial corre-
lation criterion can be calculated and evaluated, the exclusion restriction criterion
must be argued on a case by case basis. Some of the most widely known examples
of instrumental variable studies include [12, 11], both of which use date of birth, an
exogeneous variable beyond the control of each individual, as the instrument variable
for the treatment assignment.
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Instrumental variables can also be applied in combination with randomized experi-
ments. Recall from §2.2 that when non-compliance exists in randomized experiments,
the realized treatment status is confounded, as not all participants comply with the
treatment status based on some endogeneous factors. In such cases, the assigned
treatment can be used as the instrument for the realized treatment. It is obvious that
the two are partially correlated. In addition, exclusion restriction can be justified
as the treatment assignment is random, and it affects the realized outcomes of the
subjects only through its correlation with the treatment status. This method is called
the intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis.
We should be careful about the interpretation of the results from IV. If we assume
that the treatment effect is constant, the estimate would be both ATE and ATT.
If the treatment effect is heterogeneous, however, we can only obtained the local
average treatment effect (LATE) [65]. As a special case of heterogeneouos treatment
effect, LATE reports the average treatment effect on a subgroup of the subjects called
compliers.
2.4.2 Regression Discontinuity
Regression discontinuity assumes that the treatment is determined by an observed
forcing variable being on either side of a common threshold. The threshold creates
a discontinuity in the conditional probability of treatment assignment. The forcing
variable may be associated with the potential outcome, but such an association needs
to be smooth. If a forcing variable and a discontinuity can be justified, we can assume
individuals close to the boundary are similar not only in their covariates but also in
their potential outcomes. For them, the treatment assignment can be seen as random
and the difference in the observed outcomes would represent the treatment effect.
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That is:
ATERD = E[y(1)i − y
(0)
i | v ≈ c]
= lim
v→c+
E[yi | vi = v]− lim
v→c−
E[yi | vi = v],
(2.14)
where vi is the forcing variable and c is the threshold.
Discontinuities are usually found when there is administrative policy that has
transparent rules in assigning treatment. For example, in studying the electoral
advantage to incumbency, [77] uses the vote share as the forcing variable and the
50% majority vote as the threshold.
2.4.3 Difference-in-Differences
The difference-in-differences (DID) method is frequently used to analyze natural
experiments, where individuals are divided into treatment groups and control groups
naturally by policy changes or natural phenomena, and we can observe the outcomes
for both the treated and untreated individuals both before and after the natural
experiment. Under such conditions, only individuals in the treatment group are
exposed to treatment. In addition, they are exposed only after the treatment starts.
We can first compute the difference within each individual before and after the time of
the treatment, and then compare the differences among individuals across treatment
groups. After the double differencing, the biases due to the permanent difference
between the control and treatment groups and the biases due to the time change
regardless of the treatment are both removed.
It is worth mentioning that the three strategies introduced in this section can
be used either alone or in combination. For example, in analyzing randomized field
experiments, one may use instrumental variables for intent-to-treat analysis, and at
the same time construct counterfactual outcomes using difference-in-differences.
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CHAPTER III
Emoji Promotes Developer Participation on
GitHub
As demonstrated in Chapter I, the first step to promoting pro-social behavior
is to understand what may affect people’s behaviors. In this chapter, we present a
study that focuses on this first stage of the pipeline. More specifically, we focus our
study on developer participation on GitHub, the world’s largest open-source platform.
Through a careful statistical analysis, we show that the use of emojis in presenting
an issue increases discussion participation. These findings not only deepen our un-
derstanding of developer communities, they also provide design implications on how
to facilitate interactions and broaden developer participation.
3.1 Introduction
As the Linus’s law of software development states, “given enough eyeballs, all
bugs are shallow” [97]. That said there are never enough eyeballs in the developer
community. On one hand, there might not be enough experts in the field. On the
other, the such computer-mediated communications (CMC) may be less engaging
in nature, due to a lack of non-verbal cues, which occur natually in face-to-face
conversations [75]. These cues include body language, facial expressions, eye contact,
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vocal intonation, personal distance, etc.
An intuitive way to nudge more participation in the online developer community,
therefore, is to bring non-verbal cues into the conversations. Indeed, Github imple-
mented a “reaction” function in March 2016, in an effort to establish such non-verbal
cues and facilitate communication between developers. Similar to the reaction func-
tion in Facebook, the “reaction” function allows users to select from a predefined set
of emoji as a reaction to a conversation on GitHub, (as shown in Figure 3.1).1 As of
June 2019, GitHub supports eight reaction types, namely (+1), (-1), (laugh),
(confused), (heart), (hooray), (rocket), and (eyes).2
Figure 3.1: A Screenshot of the Reaction Function on GitHub.
Beyond the eight reactions, however, emoji have been supported on Github since
as early as 2014.3 These graphic symbols carrying specific meanings are quickly
adopted into online conversations, supported by multiple platforms, and inducted
into Unicode standards. Indeed, in recent years, several researchers have focused on
understanding emoji usage on online platforms, citing emoji as the the ideal non-
verbal cues to express sentiment, strengthen expression, and adjust tone in online
communication, where facial expressions or body gestures are not available [62].
1https://github.com/blog/2119-add-reactions-to-pull-requests-issues-and-
comments
2The annotations for these emoji (in brackets) are provided by the GitHub Developer document
(https://developer.github.com/v3/reactions/, retrieved in June 2019.)
3https://guides.github.com/features/mastering-markdown/, last updated on Jan 15, 2014,
according to the web page, retrieved in June 2019
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However, existing literature has not yet quantified the impact of using emoji on
online platforms. In this study, we take the initiative to quantify the effect of emo-
jis in promoting participation within the developer community. We ask: are emoji
attracting more eyeballs and soliciting more contributions? This study contributes
not only to the study of developer participation on Github but also to the literature
on the provision of public good as well as the literature on emojis. Specifically, we
hypothesize that:
H1: Using emoji in an issue increases the participation of GitHub users in the con-
versation.
The participation of users in a conversation may be measured in whether the issue
gets commented on, the number of users commenting on the issue, or the number of
comments per user.
Not only do we care about whether using emojis attracts more users to the dis-
cussion, we would also like to find out if the discussion is more likely to lead to a
resolution of the issue, and if yes, whether the resolution is completed in a timely
manner:
H2.1: Issues with emoji are more likely to be resolved.
H2.2: Issues with emoji are resolved in a shorter time period.
Besides the effect of emoji on the participation in and the outcome of the develop-
ment task, we are also interested in whether the use of emoji in a conversation affects
the culture of the developer community. In particular, whether it reshapes the norm
of conversations on GitHub towards using more emoji:
H3. Using emoji in an issue increases the use of emoji in the comments.
The most straightforward way to test these hypotheses is to compare issues with
and without emoji. Yet the vanilla t-test would be biased due to self-selection. Indeed,
taking H1 as an example, there are many confounding factors that affect both the use
of the emoji in an issue (the treatment) and whether that issue gets discussed (the
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outcome). For example, issues with emoji are usually posted on projects with higher
fork numbers (p < 0.001), and these issues are more likely to receive comments just
because the projects are popular. In this study, we implement a rigorous statistical
method, namely propensity score matching (PSM) [101], to estimate the causal impact
of using emojis in an issue. By using PSM, we isolate the confounding variables and
find issues that differ only in whether they used emoji or not.
In the rest of this chapter, we review the related literature in 3.2, introduce the
detailed setting and data set of this study in 3.3, illustrate our methodology in 3.4,
and lay out the hypotheses to be tested in 3.5.
3.2 Literature Review
Our research is closely related to three streams of existing literature: emoji us-
age analysis, language style in online communities, and participation in open-source
communities.
Emoji Usage Analysis Increasingly popular, emoji have almost become a ubiq-
uitous language in recent years. Research on emoji usage has been conducted in a
number of applications and scenarios, such as input methods [84], instant messaging
apps [121], and social networks [21]. Compared to plain text, their compact visual
representation has attracted researchers to study the intentions of using emoji [62] and
the semantics and sentiments of emoji [52, 2]. Their rich semantics has also made
emoji prone to misinterpretations and ambiguity, which is discussed extensively in
[92, 91, 2]. These studies motivate us to study the community-specific properties
and interpretation of emoji. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to
study emoji usage in a tech community and the first one that measures its effect in
attracting participation in that community.
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Language Styles in Online Communities To emoji or not is arelated to word
choice in different language styles, which connects our work to literature on language
styles in online communities. Language choice may affect the attractiveness of a
message [111]. Thus, language style, together with how it evolves, is believed to
be part of community norms [46, 45, 55]. Research both in lab settings [93] and on
Twitter [44] has shown that participants tend to converge to its community’s language
style. We will show that emoji are part of the language norm on GitHub, and we will
discuss how such a norm is formed.
Participation in Open-Source Communities Open-source communities and
platforms, such as GitHub, have attracted the attention of researchers in various
fields, such as software engineering [94, 105], CSCW [43, 113, 87], and management
science [99, 17]. Researchers have identified many key factors that affect participation
and performance, such as network structure among the collaborators [87] and status
motivations [99]. Most of this work focuses on collaboration and coding performance.
Our work focuses on communications through issues and pull requests, and analyzes
the effect of non-verbal language tokens (emoji) on user participation.
3.3 GitHub and its Archival Data
Before offering our analysis, we first introduce background information about
GitHub and how our data are collected and processed to enable analysis.
GitHub4 is the largest host of source code in the world. It offers distributed version
control and source code management via the Git protocal, and has become one of the
most popular platforms for hosting open-source software.
On open-source software platforms like GitHub, most distributed development
activities are coordinated through issues and pull requests. Issues can be posted by
4https://github.com/
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any user to report software bugs, enhancement suggestions, or to solicit help. They
are frequently used as a tracking system for ideas, enhancements, tasks, bugs, or other
user feedback.5 On the other hand, pull requests (Abbreviated as PR) are proposed
changes to the code repository. Collaborators can discuss and review such changes
and decide if the change should be merged into the code base.6
Conversations on GitHub are organized through comments on the issues and pull
requests. Different from common online chatters, these conversations can directly
influence the quality of the projects. Adequate and timely response to an issue is
critical for the solution of the problem and the improvement of the project. Therefore,
we focuses on issues and their responses in this project.
Although GitHub hosts both private and public code repositories, we only focus
on the public repositories. These repositories are accessible to all users, and are
considered “open-source.”Activities on these public repositories, such as creating,
closing, or commenting on an issue, are collected by GibHub, and streamed to the
public through its Events APIs.7 A third-party website, named GHTorrent,8 monitors
the public events streams and maintains a scalable, queryable, offline data mirror for
public access. It also actively queries GitHub’s API to retrieve profile information of
both users and projects with an internal algorithm.
Our analysis is based solely on data hosted on GHTorrent. Specifically, we collect
all the issues created in open repositories between January 1st, 2016 and June 30th,
2017, and we track their associated comments and closing events. In order to gather
more contextual information, we also retrieve the user and repository profiles related
to the collected issues. However, we acknowledge that GitHub does not provide
backtracking for historical profiles and that GHTorrent retrieves and archives profile
information at a self-determined frequency. Therefore, we use the archived profile
5https://help.github.com/en/articles/about-issues
6https://help.github.com/en/articles/about-pull-requests
7https://developer.github.com/v3/, retrieved June 2019
8http://ghtorrent.org/, retrieved June 2019. Also see [57].
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Table 3.1: GitHub Data Collection on GHTorrent
Table Description
Events
Public event streams, where IssuesEvent and IssueCommentEvent
will be extracted.
Repos Repository where an issue is posted.
Users Users who create the issues.
information that is closest to the creation of an issue as the surrogate. The list of







Figure 3.2: Weekly Stats of Issues with and without Emojis.
We plot weekly trending stats in Figure 3.2. Each dot represents the number
of issues with or without emoji created in a week. The issues with emoji are still
relatively few compared with issues without emoji. In fact, among the 11 million
issues that we track, only 1.33% of them used one or more emoji. However, we do
see an increasing trend in the use of emoji.
The imbalanced ratio between issues with and without emoji posts a class imbal-
ance challenge for most machine learning models. Intuitively, a model would achieve
> 98% accuracy by predicting all issues as not using emoji. To address the imbalance
problem, we perform undersampling to match the number of issues with and without
emojis at the week level before further analysis. After the undersampling, we arrived
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at a dataset with 366,382 issues posted by 204,265 authors in 165,969 repositories.
In the rest of the chapter, we examine if using emoji has a positive effect on the
open-source platform.
3.4 Propensity Score Matching
We followed the Propensity Score Matching introduced in §2.3 to formulate the
problem. A majority of the issues do not use emoji at all. The issues that did
use emoji can be regarded as the early adopters from the perspective of innovation
diffusion. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to focus on them first. This leads us to
focus on the average treatment effect on treated (ATET, or ATT).
In our case, the propensity score is the probability that an issue uses emoji. By
propensity score matching, we identify issues with a similar propensity score and
assume that these issues are comparable. In such a way, we run a pseudo-randomized
experiment in which the treatment of using emoji is randomly assigned to issues
that are similar otherwise. The different outcomes of these issues are, therefore, only
caused by whether they used emoji or not.
In classic econometrics literature, the propensity score is usually estimated with
a logistic regression model, with treatment variable d as the dependent variable and
the covariate X as the independent variables. However, the estimation is no different
than a machine learning predictive model that learns to predict the treatment d with
covariate X. In our analysis, we are going to apply two standard and commonly used
machine learning algorithms to estimate the propensity score.
Below, we first detail the implementation of the propensity score estimation in
3.4.1 and assess the covariate balance in 3.4.2.
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Table 3.2: Features used in propensity score estimation.
Category Features
issue length, posting time, text content (through topic modeling)
repository
# stars, # forks, # watch, # open issues,
main program language, repository age,
issue author
# follower, # following, # public repos account age
prior emoji usage.
3.4.1 Propensity Score Esimation
Although logistic regression is commonly used to estimate the propensity score, it
assumes the linearity and additivity, which may or may not hold in reality. Instead
of explicitly specifying non-linear terms (such as higher-order terms) or interaction
terms in logistic regression, we apply a machine learning algorithm, namely Gradient
Boosted Regression Tree (GBRT), as our propensity score model. This is aligned with
recent literature [118, 76], which demonstrate with simulation studies that machine
learning algorithms can improve the balance between treated and untreated groups.
The data collected from GHTorrent have provided us abundant information not
only about the issues themselves but also about the context of the issues, such as
the repository in which an issue is posted and the author who raised the issue. Such
contextual information would also affect the probability of using emoji and should
be modeled into the propensity score estimation. We summarize the features for
propensity score estimation in Table 3.2.
As presented in Table 3.2, most features are structured, either as boolean/numerical
variables or as categorical variables, the latter of which can easily be represented as
a series of dummy variables. However, the text content of an issue is unstructured
by nature. By all means, the topics expressed in an issue may correlate with emoji
usage and must be accounted for in the propensity score estimation. For example,
users who post issues to solicit help may be more likely to use emoji to express their
sentiment, or users who report bugs may be more likely to use certain emoji (such as
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) to refer to bugs, etc.
The simplest way to represent text as structured features is to use the bag-of-
word representation, which treats each word (or other language units) as a feature
and its occurrence (sometimes reweighted with TF-IDF) as the value. Although
this approach has been successful in many information retrieval models and text
mining applications, it usually explodes the dimensions of the feature representations
and increases the sparsity in the data, leading to slow convergence or even non-
convergence.
There are several ways to reduce the dimensions of the text features. For example,
one may use word embedding techniques (such as word2vec [90] or LINE [112]) to
tranfer each word into a vector in a low dimension space. Each issue can be repre-
sented as a vector in the same space by aggregating its words in a pre-defined way.
However, it is usally hard to interpret the meaning of each dimension. In this work,
we apply a principled machine learning algorithms to cluster the text into a smaller
number of topics, which are commonly referred to as topic modeling [25]. Specifi-
cally, we apply the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model, which has been widely
adopted in text mining applications.
Topics in Issues As previously outlined, we conduct topic modeling using LDA
before training propensity estimation models in order to obtain the topic representa-
tion of the issue text. The number of topics is usually determined by trying different
numbers, interpreting the word distributions of the topics, and selecting the models
that are most interpretable.We empirically set the number at 30, which performs well
in separating different topics. We present the discovered topics in Table 3.3, where
we show the representative words in each model and the topic labels heuristically
assigned based on the representative words. We can observe that several topics have
a clear meaning.
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Table 3.3: Topics in the Issues
ID Topic Representative Words
0 Ruby (package)
fastlane, version, users, ruby, gems, ios, end, build, xcode, library, false, app,
http-cookie, lib, env
1 Ruby/Game
server, client, thread, log, understood, item, message, address, export method,




x, please, version, issue, bug, report, check, feature, information, z, expected, issues,
api, pod, one
3 PHP
var, function, php, object, task, http, array, exception, diff, web, line, virtualenv,
app, vendor, null
4 code/mixed
value, type, data, pass, released, left, invisible, name, distant, vendors, integer, green,
red, record, rouge
5 code e, de, r, b, c, u, n, l, w, p, v, la, en, x, que
6 Python file, debug, line, python, lib, usr, couple, error, root, self, local, home, py, docker, fail
7 Rust (language)
src, group, future, build, png, integrate, cargo, mins, go, core, frustrations, rustc,
home, downloading, panicking
8 code (keyword)
use, code, string, using, test, example, new, return, type, public, like, project, data,
one, get
9 C/Java
src, h, error, include, home, c, int, const, usr, jdk, function, warning, future, void,
local
10 JavaScript
error, node modules, users, js, app, build, version, node, code, npm, get, module, lib,
run, import




f, instructions, commercial, error, warning, game, sound, c, roda, earlier, engine, win,
games, documents, users
13 JavaScript
silly, c, active, users, packages, error, verbose, atom, core, facility, node modules,




compiling, gulp, android, decoded, go, src, build, storage, debug, turn, users,
package, h, detecting, ctx
15 code/mix






npm, err, depth, common.py, support, number, version, add, theme, index, please,
data, leaks, product, according
17 Java
info, c, error, test, source, main, java, users, failed, ago, file, jar, researcher, class,
method
18 Swift/IDE
g, nil, let, workaround, spacemacs, variables, emacs, file, vim, branch, window,
behaviour, layers, setup.py, join
19 HTML
align, supports, td, center, aliases, right, option, value, class, implication, width,
height, l, codecs, kanji
20 code
name, id, map, xml, event, key, nil, values, layer, select, progress, plugin, data,
public, resource
21 code (html)
class, div, style, width, href, color, title, faraday-cookie jar, text, img, src, image, alt,
css, height
22 MacOS
usr, local, bin, install, git, build, version, library, homebrew, checking, installing,
package, remote, directory, installed
23 code false, n, true, user, text, name, given, time, z, f, place, say, ti, target, reach
24 GitHub
issue, add, github, close, update, create, comment, list, column, issues, project,
columns, pull, default, card
25 code/mix





studio, ptr, vs, target, href, zombies, app, plants, player, worker, video, id,
accordance, multiply, mail
27 Ruby
lib, gems, ruby, bundle, unit, block, usr, vendor, users, home, uploaded, call, local,
bundler, opt
28 contact/logistics
br, windows, href, pdf, android, download, free, experimental, performing, ordered,
fault, partially, word, pinned, mailto
29 Rake (Ruby tool)
rake, version, browser, behavior, description, steps, reproduce, windows, url, system,
mobile, problem, operating, expected, type
Evaluation Generally, machine learning tasks are evaluated with out-sample pre-
diction accuracy. People usually adopt cross-validation to train their models on the
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training set and evaluate their models on a hold-out validation set. This simulates
the application scenario where the models trained on the labeled training set are used
to predict the labels on the unseen test set.
In propensity score estimation, however, out-sample prediction accuracy is not the
focus of the prediction, as we already know the treatment of each sample. Indeed,
there is not a single metric that can be used to evaluate the propensity score. The
reason is simple: In observational studies, we would never know the real probability of
getting treated. The lack of ground truth prevents any objective measurements of the
accuracy of the predicted propensity score. Instead of an accuracy score, however, we
can evaluate whether the matching based on the estimated propensity score is good
enough to derive causal conclusions. Since there are several variations of propensity
score matching, the evaluation method depends largely on the matching. In the
next subsection, we first describe the matching method and then perform alternative
evaluations on propensity score estimation.
3.4.2 Propensity Score Stratification and Balance Check
Now that we have estimated the propensity score for each issue, there are several
ways to match issues on their propensity scores, such as nearest neighbor matching,
kernel matching, and stratification matching. Before making decisions on the method
to use, it is helpful to perform a visual analysis on the distribution of the propensity
score. In Figure 3.3, we stratified the issues into 20 equal-size strata based on their
propensity scores. For each stratum, we plot the average propensity score of all issues
and the the true selection ratio (ratio of issues with emoji). If the propensity score
is estimated correctly, the selection ratio of each stratum should equal the mean
propensity score of the apps in the bin. In other words, we should expect a line close
to y = x. Indeed, the blue dotted line in Figure 3.3 is aligned with the reference
diagonal line (orange dashed), which is reassuring.
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However, a concerning fact shown in the figure is that for the last two strata, the
ratios of issues with emoji are very close to 1 (0.983 and 0.999), which poses a large
threat to the common support assumption introduced in §2.3. That is, there are too
few untreated samples to calculate the difference between the treated and untreated
samples. [107] suggests a trimming procedure to exclude the intervals which lack
common support. As we will see later, these two strata fail the balance check, which
is also likely due to the violation of the common support assumption.




















Figure 3.3: Binned average propensity score and true selection ratio
The trimming procedure natually leads us to the stratification matching, which
is also referred to as interval matching, blocking, and subclassification [102]. In our
case, we reuse the 20 equally sized strata based on their propensity scores. In such
a way, each stratum has a similar number of issues, and the issues in each stratum
have similar propensity scores.
In propensity score matching, people usually rely on balance checks to determine
if the matched samples (of both treated and untreated) are similar or comparable
other than their treatment status. Specifically, we want to check if the covariate
distribution is balanced between the treated and untreated samples.
Ideally, the issues within a stratum would be considered as matched, and their
difference in outcome can be regarded as the treatment effect. However, if the propen-
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sity score estimation is not correctly specified, these issues may have quite different
covariate distributions and may still not be comparable even if they share a similar
propensity score.
Instead of significance testing, literature has suggested standardized mean differ-







where X1 and X2 are sample mean for the treated and control groups, respectively;
S21 and S
2
2 are sample variance for the treated and control groups.
Similarly, SMD for binary variable is defined as:
SMD =
p̂1 − p̂2√
(p̂1(1− p̂1) + p̂2(1− p̂2)) /2
, (3.2)
where p̂1 and p̂2 are observed probability of the binary variables in the treated and
control groups, respectively. There isn’t a clear cut-off for SMD score. Some literature
has suggested using 0.1 or 0.25 as reasonable cutoffs for acceptable standardized
biases. [108].
We visualize the SMD score of all covariate-stratum combination as a 2-D heatmap
in Figure 3.4. Such visualization allows us to assess the SMD score of each covariate
in each stratum while also examine how the SMD score is distributed across covariates
and strata. The left plot corresponds to the GBRT propensity score model, which
we discussed earlier in this section. We see that most of the cells have a light color,
indicating a good covariate balance. However, the two rightmost columns are much
darker, with many cells of the darkest color. As discussed earlier, these columns
correspond to the strata of extremely high propensity scores, and almost all issues
in these strata use emoji. The dense dark spots indicate that these issues are poorly
matched, which may suffer from a lack of common support. The rest of the heatmap
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still has scattered dark spots, but they are not as concentrated. To conclude, after
trimming the 2 strata due to the lack of common support, we should be able to draw
causal conclusions on the remaining 18 strata.
To check the sensitivity of the specification of our GBRT model, we trained an-
other GBRT model with a slightly different set of features. Specifically, we exclude
the main program language features in the new specification. Similarly, we plot the
SMD distribution of all the covariates (including the main program language) in Fig-
ure 3.4 (middle). Similar to the correctly specified model, the misspecified model
also yields a poor balance on the two strata of the highest propensity scores. The
area of main program language covariates, which were left out in the misspecified
model, is slightly darker than its neighbor, but the rest of the heatmap remains light
with scattered dark spots, which is also similar to the correctly specified model. This
sensitivity check confirms that the balance is relatively robust to misspecification.
We also plot the heatmap of SMD distribution based on a logistic regression model
of the same feature set for comparing purpose (Figure 3.4, right). Aside from the two
highest strata, whose imbalance is consistent with the GBRT models, we can see
many more dark sports on the heatmap. The “Author Following,” “Author Public
Repos,” “Body Length,” and “Body Tokens” features are imbalanced in almost all
propensity score strata. This is likely due to the non-linearity of these features and
verifies the advantage of machine learning models in estimating propensity scores in
complex scenarios.
3.5 Results
By matching issues with similar propensity scores, we assure that the distribution
of the confounding factors is balanced within each stratum. In each stratum, issues
with and without emojis are comparable, and the unbiased treatment effect (of using
emojis) can be estimated. In Table 3.4, we report the test statistics of the dependent
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Figure 3.4: Balance Check for Propensit Score Estimation
The color of each cell represents the SMD score of one covariate (indicated on the
y-axis) in the stratum (indicated on the x-axis). The darker the color, the larger the
SMD score. We cap the maximum SMD at 0.2, and all SMD scores larger than 0.2
are also represented as the darkest color.
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Table 3.4:
The Effect of Using Emojis in Issues. Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and
significance level (first column) are estimated by pooling treatment effects
and variance in each stratum. We also report the observed difference and
the average values in the second and third columns.
Hypothesis Dependent Variable ATE Observed ∆ Avg.
H1
getting comment 0.054∗∗∗ 0.131 0.585
# comments 0.27∗∗∗ 0.782 2.186
# users who comment 0.161∗∗∗ 0.407 1.171
# comments / user† 0.001 0.014 1.668
H2
prop. of issues closed in 30 days 0.017∗∗∗ 0.045 0.498
issue closing time (days)‡ -0.370∗∗∗ -0.633 4.357
H3 prop. of comments w/ emojis 0.110∗∗∗ 0.116 0.086
Significance level: *** 0.001, ** 0.01, or * 0.05 level.
† Computed on issues with one or more comment(s).
‡ Computed on issues closed in < 30 days only.
variables. For each outcome variable, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE)
by pooling the stratum-specific treatment effects [63]. And we pool the variances of
the stratum-specific treatment effects as the estimate of variance [16, 85]. We calculate
the z-score based on these estimates and report the significance level after adjusting
for multiple hypotheses testing.
3.5.1 Increasing Participation
We first see if using emoji brings more discussions to an issue, which can be
measured by the likelihood of getting comments or the number of comments. As
shown in Table 3.4, issues with emoji are more likely to get comments (ATE =
5.4%, p < 0.001). And on average, issues with emoji get 0.27 more (p < 0.001)
comments than those without. We may further decompose the effect into two factors,
and check if this is because more users participate in the conversation or if the intensity
of the participation increases. The former can be viewed as the extensive margin,
while the latter as the intensive margin. We see that an issue with emoji attracts
0.161 more (p < 0.001) users to comment, however, for those who do post comments,
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their average number of comments under the same issues does not differ much between
the treated and untreated. This significance along the extensive margin suggests
that using emojis does attract more users’ attention to join the discussion, while
the insignificance along the intensive margin indicates that the activity level among
participants is not affected.
Such results can be explained by the roles non-verbal cues play in Computer-
Mediated Communication (CMC) [48, 49]. In the absence of facial expressions, non-
verbal cues like emojis can express humor, or adjust the tone to be more friendly or
less serious. (Consider the use of for bugs!) With emoji, communication is made
more funny and engaging, which attracts more participation from the audience. Note
that the insignificance along the intensive margin is not surprising, and coincides with
several other factors, including monetary incentives, which were initially believed to
increase participation. For example, both [66] and [119] suggest increased monetary
incentives draw more participation, but not necessarily of higher quality.
3.5.2 Resolving Issues
We have shown that emoji attract more discussions to issues. However, people
do not simply want their issues to be watched; they want their issues to be resolved
– bugs fixed, features added, questions answered. Does the increased participation
brought by emoji actually help to resolve the issues? On GitHub, we can test this
hypothesis (H2.1) by looking at the closing status of the issues. Specifically, an issue
being closed usually indicates that the issue has been properly handled. We compare
the proportion of issues being closed and the average closing time between those with
and without emoji.
Indeed, we find that issues with emoji are more likely to get closed within 30
days (∆ = 1.7%, p < 0.001). Also, among those closed issues, the time spent before
closing also decreases significantly for issues with emojis, with an average of 0.37 days
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(p < 0.001). Therefore, one can infer that the attention and participation the emoji
attract are not from mere bystanders. Instead, the increased participation does help
to resolve issues in a timely manner.
3.5.3 Reshaping Community Norms
With the help of propensity score matching, we have shown that emojis do increase
participation, and such participation does help to resolve issues. Does the use of emoji
have an effect beyond development tasks, but on community culture as well? Does
emoji use by one user influence others? Are emoji reshaping GitHub community
norms? Inspired by these questions, we test whether the use of emojis in an issue
results in more emoji used.
Following the same process of propensity score matching, we test if using emoji
in issues increases the use of emoji in their comments. From Table 3.4, we can
see that more comments (∆ = 11.0%, p < 0.001) use emoji in reply to issues with
emoji. There are two potential explanations for such an increase: emoji in the issues
may raise awareness of emoji among the audience, and the audience may use emoji
reciprocally to issues with emoji. This suggests that there is an upward spiral of using
emoji. With such spiral, emoji are becoming the new norm of the GitHub community.
In Table 3.4, we also report the observed difference in the measured outcome be-
tween issues with and without emoji, without propensity score matching. In general,
we see that the observed difference is several times larger than the estimated treat-
ment effect. Such discrepancy evidences the need to adopt PSM in order to correct
the selection bias.
3.6 Conclusion
With propensity score matching, we confirmed the effect of using emoji in in-
creasing participation and resolving issues on GitHub. We also show that the use of
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emoji leads to more emoji usage in response, which is consistent with the increasing
adoption of emoji. If we put this in the context of our end-to-end pipeline, the conclu-
sion successfully identified using emoji as a potential nudge to promote the pro-social
behaviors on the open-source platform.
This study draws several implications for open-source platforms and other online
communities as well.
First, our work provides direct evidence of the positive effects of using emoji in
user engagement and problem solving. In fact, the low ratio of posts containing emoji
indicates a great opportunity for the GitHub community to promote emoji in con-
versations, through the designs of recommender systems or specialized interfaces. In
general, one may expect that other visual features may have similar effects in engag-
ing user participation. Narrowly speaking, GitHub and other developer communities
like StackOverflow may consider adding more visual features to attract users into
discussions, such as animations or GIF images. Broadly, adding visual designs into
traditionally text-heavy tasks not only adds fun to the work, but may also help engage
users in the tasks and even improve the quality of work.
Second, emoji may be an effective instrument for understanding and comparing
different groups of users in online communities. On one hand, they are widely adopted
in daily communications, yet they are not strongly tied to their different daily tasks,
which makes them a suitable common ground to compare across different user groups.
On the other hand, emoji are compact and usually have clear semantics, which eases
the pain of natural language understanding for particular domains (e.g., dealing with
cross-lingual texts, slang, professional vocabularies, or hashtags). Emoji are also
associated with rich sentiment, which is convenient for analyzing the interpersonal
relationships and emotional norms of online communities.
There are some limitations to our work. Although propensity score matching is
employed to address the selection bias, it relies on the Conditional Independence
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Assumption (CIA), which is hard to fully justify in our case. CIA assumes that X
includes all confounding variables that affect the use of emoji and the potential out-
come. However, some variables may not be observable or they may be hard to model.
For example, project content and developer age may be unobserved confounders. The
ideal way to estimate the effect of using emojis is to design a randomized experiment,
which is beyond the scope of this empirical work.
Our paper only analyzes communication that happens through issues. However,
communications may also go through other channels, such as Gitter, an instant-
messaging service that connects easily with GitHub. This may have introduced biases
to our analysis. Due to the lack of timestamps and user information, we did not
include the emoji responses in our analysis and only focused on the emoji used in the
free text. We may have underestimated the popularity of emoji and the proportion
of users who used emoji.
A clear future direction is to study the heterogeneous effect of different emoji. For
example, emojis of strong positive or negative sentiment may have different effects
on the participation. It is also intriguing to conduct a finer-grained analysis, by
classifying the issues into different purposes and classifying the users into different
roles. Emojis may be used differently for different purposes and when the user takes
certain roles in a collaborative project.
Finally, we cannot proceed with the second or third stages in our pipeline, as we
are not able to implement an emoji recommender system on the GitHub platform. Nor
can we test its effectiveness via field experiment. In the next two chapters, however,
we implement and evaluate recommender systems in real-world settings, which allows
us to examine the full potential of our pipeline.
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CHAPTER IV
Recommending Teams Promotes Pro-social
Lending in Online Microfinance.
In this chapter, we focus on the second and third stages of the end-to-end pipeline.
We reports the results of a large-scale field experiment based on the hypothesis that
group membership can increase participation and pro-social lending for an online
crowdlending community, Kiva. The hypothesis was proposed in a companion study.
The experiment uses variations on a simple email manipulation to encourage Kiva
members to join a lending team, testing which types of team recommendation emails
are most likely to get members to join teams as well as the subsequent impact on
lending. We find that emails do increase the likelihood that a lender joins a team,
and that joining a team increases lending in a short window (one week) following
intervention. The impact on lending is large relative to median lender lifetime loans.
We also find that lenders are more likely to join teams recommended based on location
similarity rather than team status. Our results suggest team recommendation can be
an effective behavioral mechanism to increase pro-social lending.
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4.1 Introduction
Understanding strategies to increase pro-social behavior has important policy im-
plications. Charities have explored various mechanisms to increase giving, such as
seed money, matching gifts and peer pressure [10]. In comparison, an under-explored
class of mechanisms utilizes group membership and inter-group competition [3, 110]
to increase both participation and giving amounts. Compared to price-based strate-
gies, such as matching gifts and rebates, empirical analysis of naturally-occurring
data indicates that identity-based mechanisms have longer-lasting effects [32]. Our
research explores two questions through a large-scale field experiment on a crowdlend-
ing community with a natural group structure (teams). First, which types of team
recommendations are most likely to motivate lenders to join teams? Second, once
they join a team, what is the subsequent impact on lending?
Our research is conducted at Kiva.org, a crowdlending community created to help
micro and small enterprises in developing countries, which often lack access to the
formal banking sector. Specifically, Kiva partners with local microfinance institutions
to match individual lenders with low-income entrepreneurs in developing countries as
well as selected cities within the United States. Through Kiva’s platform, anyone
can make a zero-interest loan of $25 or more to support an entrepreneur. Since its
inception in 2005, Kiva has increased its membership significantly. However, while
many lenders join Kiva for pro-social motives, they do not participate fully. Indeed,
thirty-six percent of them have never made a single loan, and many others do not
come back to Kiva after making their first loan [83]. Kiva’s challenge is not unique,
as many online contribution communities struggle with the issue of how to sustain
member engagement and contributions.
To increase member engagement, some online communities have created group
structures. For example, in 2008, Kiva instituted a lending teams program, a system
through which lenders can create teams or join existing teams of other lenders. Once
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a team is created, it appears on Kiva’s team leaderboard, which sorts teams by the
total loan amounts designated to them by their team members. Since 2008, more
than 38,957 Kiva teams have been created based on lender group affiliations such as
organizations, geographic location, religious affiliation, or sports interests. Of note,
many of the highly ranked teams are identity based, such as the “Atheists” and
the “Kiva Christians.” Each team has a dedicated forum where team members can
coordinate their lending activities, ask and answer questions, and set goals for the
team.
The use of groups to increase charitable contributions has intuitive appeal, but its
success is difficult to measure with naturally-occurring field data because of sample
selection bias. For example, lenders who join teams might simply be those who are
more active in general [32]. To establish the causal relationship between group mem-
bership and pro-social lending, we use a randomized field experiment which enables
us to combine the control of a laboratory experiment with the external validity of a
field study [59, 35].
Our novel approach is inspired by the economic theory of social identity [3, 4] as
well as the development of big data analytics in computer science. Research on social
identity has consistently found that people derive their sense of identity from groups
[36, 40]. This group identity can be used to increase voluntary contribution and
improve coordination among team members in the laboratory [26, 51, 30, 42, 31, 29].
Building on these findings, we conduct a large-scale randomized field experiment
to evaluate the effectiveness of team recommendation as a behavioral mechanism for
increasing participation among Kiva members. Our approach enables us to synthesize
the predictive accuracy of machine learning with the causal inference of economic
theory and field experiments [72].
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4.2 Literature Review
Our study builds upon findings from three streams of literature: charitable giving,
advertising and recommender systems, and social identity. The charitable giving
literature has uncovered several motivations and mechanisms for people to voluntarily
give to charity [10]. In addition to the neoclassical preferences for public goods [23],
people might derive a “warm glow” from the amount they give, which increases giving
[6, 7]. People also respond positively to mechanisms which decrease the price of
giving, such as tax subsidies [18], matching gifts or rebates [50, 70]. Sequential giving
mechanisms [8, 86, 114], which utilize leadership gifts to transmit information or
signal the value of the public good, have been shown to increase giving in the lab and
field [96, 79]. Closely related to our study, researchers have shown both theoretically
and experimentally that people might give because they care about their social image
[9, 13], peer pressure [89], or social pressure [47]. In our context, when lenders join
a team, team members can activate several of these mechanisms, such as leadership
giving and social pressure, by posting messages on the team forum [32].
Our research is also related to the advertising literature. Recent field experiments
show that advertising content, especially when it appeals to intuition, significantly
affects demand [24]. More generally, personalized recommendations based on vari-
ous machine learning algorithms have increased consumer adoption of recommended
items, and have thus been widely used by e-commerce sites [98, 69]. Instead of rec-
ommending items, such as products, our study recommends lending teams to Kiva
users.
Lastly, our study builds upon social identity theory [110, 3], and recent exper-
imental research that uncovers the positive effects of group identity on voluntary
contribution and coordination in the laboratory [26, 51, 30, 42, 31, 37, 29] and the
field [53]. Our team recommendation approach extends social identity research to the




In our study, we use a lender’s likelihood of joining a team to recommend teams
based on both homophily and status. Homophily refers to the tendency to associate
with similar others [88, 56]. As such, we recommend teams to lenders based on their
similarity to the existing members of those teams. In our study, we use two different
measures of homophily: location similarity and loan history similarity. The former is
based on the number of lenders in a team who share the same location as the target
lender, whereas the latter is based on how often the lenders have lent to the same
borrowers. In addition to homophily, we recommend teams based on status [104],
using the top three teams on the Kiva leaderboard as the high-status teams. The
details of the recommendation algorithms are illustrated as follows.
Recommendations based on team status The simplest recommendation strat-
egy is to recommend teams that are ranked highly on the team leaderboard. Kiva
provides several leaderboards that rank teams based on either the total loan amount
attributed to the team or the number of team members, in the most recent month or
all time. For the experiment, we use the default leaderboard that lenders see when
they visit the Kiva Team page, the all-time total amount lent.
Note that every lender receives the same recommendations under this strategy.
The three teams we recommend to the lenders are “Atheists, Agnostics, Skeptics,...”,
“Kiva Christians,” and “Guys holding fish.”
Recommendations based on location similarity The goal of this algorithm is
to recommend the most popular teams in a lender’s local area. This is motivated by
the fact that there are many location-based teams on Kiva and by the conclusion of
our previous work that the maximum location similarity between a lender and all the
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teams is partially correlated with whether the lender has joined a team [32]. This also
reflects the results of an online data mining competition we ran with doctoral students
at the University of Michigan using the Kiva API data. The following algorithm,
written by the first author, is the one that performed best in that competition. We
calculate the location similarity between two lenders u and v as luv ∈ {0, 1, 2} [32].
If the two lenders are from different countries, luv = 0. If two lenders are from
the same city, luv = 2. The condition for luv = 1 includes the following two cases:
1) if the two lenders are not in the same city but in the same state in the United
States or Australia, or the same province in Canada, or 2) if they are from the same
country other than the United States, Australia or Canada. This is because there are
significantly more lenders on Kiva from the United States, Australia or Canada than
from any other country.
The location similarity of a team t in the neighborhood of a lender u is calculated
as the sum of the location similarities between that lender and all lenders in that
team. That is, L(u, t) =
∑
v∈T luv, where T denotes the set of lenders belonging to
team t. For every lender, we rank all teams by the location similarity of these teams
and recommend the three highest-ranked teams. For these recommendations, we ex-
clude the three teams highest on the leaderboard: “Atheists, Agnostics, Skeptics,...,”
“Kiva Christians,” and “Guys holding fish,” for two reasons. First, the Atheists and
Christians are outliers in that they overwhelm all other teams in size. Consequently,
they often appear as winners of location-similarity based recommendations. Second,
to differentiate between status-based and homophily-based recommendations, we ex-
clude all three teams.
Recommendations based on loan history similarity We also construct a rec-
ommender system based on the loan history of a lender. This is motivated by the
homophily conjecture that lenders who lend to similar borrowers share similar inter-
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ests and are thus more likely to join the same teams.
Borrowers on Kiva are registered in 80 countries from 8 geographical regions (Ocea-
nia, Asia, etc). They loan to facilitate 149 types of activities which are further cat-
egorized into 15 sectors. Let Su be a set of loans made by a user u and St be a set
of loans that are attributed to a team t. The relevance of the team to the user is






[fg(i, j) + fa(i, j)], (4.1)
where fg(i, j) equals 2 if the two loans i and j are from the same country, 1 if they
are from two different countries in the same region, and 0 if they are not from the
same region; fa(i, j) equals 2 if the two loans i and j are for the same activities, 1 if
they are for different activities in the same sector, and 0 if they are not for activities
in the same sector.
Note that the relevance score as defined in Equation ( 4.1) favors large teams that
have made many loans. We further normalize the score by taking into account the
total number of loans made by each team. That is:




Given a user who has not joined a team, we calculate the normalized relevance
score for every team and recommend the three top-scoring teams to that user. For
consistency with the recommendations based on location similarity, we also exclude
the top three teams on the leaderboard, “Atheists, Agnostics, Skeptics,...,” “Kiva
Christians,” and “Guys holding fish,” for these recommendations.
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Table 4.1: Summary of Experimental Treatments.










We employ a 3×2 factorial design (Table 4.1). Along one factor, we vary our rec-
ommendation algorithms along one factor based on lender-team location similarity,
loan history similarity, or team status.Along the other factor, we vary whether our rec-
ommendation rationale is explained to the lender. Literature suggests that providing
an explanation can increase the acceptance of a recommendation [60, 98]. By varying
whether a lender receives an explanation, we can obtain a better understanding of
whether a factor impacts the effectiveness of the recommender system. We also in-
clude a control condition where we do not contact lenders (no contact) and a placebo
condition where we email lenders to make them aware that there are lending teams
on Kiva without providing any specific recommendations (teams exist) to control for
any contact effect. The text of the email is completely identical across treatments,
except for the variables that change across treatments. Figure 4.3.2 presents a sample
email from the Location-Explanation treatment.
Each email consists of three parts. Part 1 is common to all treatments and the
placebo,
“Hi [FirstName], Since you’re such an awesome Kiva lender, we wanted to let
you know about a fun feature of the Kiva experience: Kiva Lending Teams! Lending
Teams are self-organized groups around shared interests – location, alumni orgs, social





































Figure 4.1: An Email Screenshot of the Location-Explanation treatment.
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interested in, and track your collective impact.”
Likewise, each email ends with Part 3,
“[Or] Check out the thousands of [other] lending teams to find the right one for
you.”
“Thanks for being a part of the Kiva community and making a difference around
the world.”
While the text of emails sent to lenders in the placebo (“teams exist”) condition
consists of Parts 1 and 3, lenders in the six treatments also received one of the
following in the second part of the email:
1. Leaderboard with explanation treatment (Leaderboard-Explanation):
“Some of the most popular teams are: [TEAMS].”
2. Location similarity with explanation treatment (Location-Explanation):
“Other lenders who live near you enjoy being a part of these teams: [TEAMS].”
3. Loan history similarity with explanation treatment (History-Explanation):
“Based on your past lending, people who have made similar loans enjoy being a
part of these teams: [TEAMS].
4. Recommendations without explanations treatments (Leaderboard-NoExplanation,
Location-NoExplanation, History-NoExplanation)
“Here are a few teams you may want to check out: [TEAMS].”
4.3.3 Experimental Procedure
The experiment is conducted in 2014. We use a group of 69,845 lenders who have
made at least two loans in the past six months but have never joined a team. We
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1,454,446 Public Lenders
Median # Loans: 0
69,802 Selected Lenders
Median # Loans: 23
64,800 Lenders in Analysis
Median # Loans: 22
589 Lenders Joined Teams
Median # Loans: 20
Figure 4.2: Sample and Population Comparison.
The number of lenders and median number of loans of all public users, those who
are selected as participants, those whose data is used in our analyses, and those who
joined at least one team during our experiment.
then randomly assign each lender to one of eight experimental conditions with equal
probability.1
We then assign each user to one of the treatments, the placebo, or the control
condition using stratified randomization. The stratified random assignment is based
on the total loan amount by each lender before the experiment. We want to ensure
that the most active Kiva lenders are not all concentrated into one treatment, so we
rank the lenders based their total loan amounts, taking the top 8 lenders and randomly
assigning them to different conditions. We then repeat this for each group of 8 lenders,
proceeding down the ranked list. Between assigning lenders to conditions and running
the experiment, 43 users joined a team and were dropped from our sample. This yields
a final sample of 69,802 users. The size of the sample and population is summarized
with a Venn Diagram in Figure 4.2.
Before running the experiment, we run pair-wise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests of the
1Based on Kiva Privacy Policy and the information need of our recommendation algorithms,
we include only lenders that set their pages and loans to public in their account settings, allow
marketing emails in their communication settings, and provide location information in their profile.
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Table 4.2:
Lending Statistics of Each Treatment during 6 months prior to experiment.
Lending Statistics (average)








No-Contact 8725 184.29 6.07 18.50 36.24
Teams-Exist 8725 181.15 5.96 18.33 35.89
Location-Explanation 8726 181.34 6.04 18.45 35.22
Location-NoExplanation 8726 182.68 6.02 18.32 37.13
History-Explanation 8726 181.54 5.93 18.29 37.89
History-NoExplanation 8725 181.78 5.94 18.38 35.62
Leaderboard-Explanation 8723 182.14 6.05 18.40 34.37
Leaderboard-NoExplanation 8726 195.83 6.51 18.28 37.89
Note: Pairwise Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests comparing each experimental condition with
the other yield p > 0.10 for each observable characteristic. Amount Loaned and Account
Balance are in United States dollars, whereas Repayment Term is in months.
equality of distributions based on the user statistics to verify that our randomization
produces balanced treatments across observable characteristics. The results of these
tests show that the number of loans, average amount per loan, balance, average loan
terms for fundraising or repayment, and auto-lending settings do not differ signifi-
cantly at the 10% level between any treatments. Thus, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
do not reject the hypothesis that these values are drawn from the same distribution.
We summarize the lending and location statistics of each treatment in Table 4.2.
We send each lender in our treatment groups an email from Kiva, for a total
of 61,077 emails. After excluding lenders whose emails bounced and those who
made their accounts private, we have a total of 64,800 lenders whom we intend
to treat (henceforth All). Of these lenders, we find that one-third (n = 20, 371)
open our email, constituting our treated sub-sample (henceforth Opened). We then
track the team-joining and lending behavior of each lender for the next two months.
Anonymized data will be available from the open ICPSR data repository. Our re-
search protocol was approved by the University of Michigan IRB (HUM00050208),
which exempted us from obtaining informed consent.
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% of Lenders Joining Teams
Join Recommended Team(s) Join Other Team(s)
Figure 4.3:
Proportion of Lenders Joining Teams in each Experimental Condition.
This figure presents the proportion of lenders who join a lending team in
each experimental condition after our email intervention. Location-based
recommendations exhibit a higher proportion of lenders joining recom-
mended teams (67.96%), compared to lending history similarity (42.31%)
or leaderboard-based (44.37%) recommendations (p < 0.01, proportion of
t-tests). Similar results are observed when we focus on lenders who open
our email (right panel).
4.4 Results
We first examine what types of recommendations are most effective in increasing
team membership. Figure 4.3 presents the proportion of lenders who join a lending
team in each treatment after our email intervention, for both all lenders (left panel)
and those who open our emails (right panel). For both groups, lenders who receive
a location similarity explanation are most likely to join a team, accounting for 3%
of the group who open their emails. This participation rate is comparable to that in
other charitable-giving field experiments using mailing campaigns [79, 70].
We next conduct a regression analysis (Table 4.3 and Figure 4.4) and find that
every treatment leads to a significantly higher likelihood of joining a team, compared
to the no-contact control condition, for both the all lenders (column 1) and opened-
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Table 4.3:
Treatment Effects on the Likelihood of Joining Teams: Probit Regressions.
Marginal effects reported, calculated at the mean level of the covariates.
(a) The decision to join a team is regressed on the seven treatment dummies
for all lenders in our sample (n = 64, 800). (b) The second model uses the
same specifications but is restricted to the lenders who opened their emails
or were not contacted (n = 29, 055). (c) The third model is restricted to
lenders who were sent emails and opened them (n = 20, 371). Applying
a multiple hypothesis testing correction [80] yields the same significance
levels as above, except for the “History-Explanation” variable in column
(3) which becomes insignificant at the 10% level.








Location-Explanation 0.0094*** 0.0256*** 0.0145***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Location-NoExplanation 0.0062*** 0.0189*** 0.0050
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
History-Explanation 0.0070*** 0.0212*** 0.0083**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
History-NoExplanation 0.0061*** 0.0182*** 0.0039
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Leaderboard-Explanation 0.0062*** 0.0185*** 0.0043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Leaderboard-NoExplanation 0.0063*** 0.0197*** 0.0062
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
Number of Subjects 64,800 29,055 20,371
1) Standard errors in parentheses.









−0.005 0.000 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.020
Regression Coefficients with 95% Confidence Interval
All Lenders Lenders Who Open Our Emails
Figure 4.4:
Treatment effects on the likelihood of joining teams. This figure presents
the treatment effects on the likelihood that a lender joins a lending team
(Table 4.3). When we focus on all lenders (lines with red triangle), we
find that every treatment significantly increases the likelihood of joining
a team compared to the control condition. When focusing on lenders who
open our email (lines with green circle), we find that the homophily-based
recommendations with an explanation also significantly increase the like-
lihood of joining a team, compared to the teams-exist condition. Explana-
tions increase the likelihood of joining a team for only the location-based
recommendations (All: p = 0.02; Lenders who open our email: p = 0.01;
Wald tests).
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email (column 2) groups (p < 0.01). Of those who open their emails, lenders in
the location similarity with explanations treatment are more likely to join a team
compared to those in the teams-exist condition (p < 0.01). These results are robust
to a multiple hypothesis testing correction [80].
We next explore the types of team lenders most likely to join by examining the
characteristics of teams joined by our lenders. Table 4.4 displays the results of eight
conditional logit specifications with odds ratios reported, with one specification per
treatment. In our regressions, we use whether each lender joined each team as our
dependent variable, and location similarity, loan history similarity, team status, team
size, and experimenter recommendation as our independent variables.
The results for our control and teams-exist conditions (columns 1 and 2) show
that lenders are more likely to join teams with higher location similarity and status.
The odds of a lender joining a team whose location similarity is 1 percentile higher
is 2% higher, while the odds of a lender joining a top ten team is 13 times higher
than those of joining a non-top ten team. On the other hand, we find that neither
lending history nor team size impacts lenders’ choices. These findings show that
lenders value both homophily and status when deciding to join a team. It is also
noteworthy that location and status information are easily found on Kiva’s website
while lending histories are more difficult to locate.
Interestingly, we find that the provision of a location similarity recommendation
mitigates the influence of team status, leading lenders to join recommended teams
or teams with higher history similarity (columns 3 and 4). By contrast, our recom-
mendations based on loan history similarity (columns 5 and 6) do not substantially
change how lenders choose their teams. Finally, recommendations based on team
status (columns 7 and 8) seem to change lender behavior in a way similar to that of
location-based recommendations, but only when we explain our recommendations.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Difference-in-Differences Regressions of Average Daily Lending Amount
(2SLS).
1st Stage 2nd Stage: Average Amount OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
1-Day 7-Day 30-Day 1-Day 7-Day 30-Day
Email 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.001)
Join Team 298.558∗∗∗ 55.914∗∗∗ 10.231 5.257∗∗∗ 0.566∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(72.283) (21.058) (7.318) (0.755) (0.337) (0.134)
Constant 0.0045∗∗∗ -2.660∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗ 0.007 -0.433∗∗∗ -0.147∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.670) (0.195) (0.068) (0.072) (0.032) (0.013)
Obs. 64,800 64,800 64,800 64,800 64,800 64,800 64,800
1) Standard errors in parentheses.
2) Significant at the: ∗ 10%, ∗∗ 5%, and ∗∗∗ 1% levels.
The endogenous variable, whether a lender joins a team (“Join Team”), is instrumented
with whether a lender receives an email in the experiment (“Email”). As the results of a
two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression, the coefficients on the “Join Team”
variable in columns (2)-(4) give local average treatment effects, or the effects on the subset
of lenders who only join a team because of our email (“compliers”). The different columns
give different window sizes in a difference-in-differences setting. The effect is significant up
to a week after we send the email. Ordinary least squares estimates are also displayed in
columns (5)-(7) for comparison. The difference between the IV and OLS estimates is due to
the difference in the local average treatment effects (given by the IV regressions), which only
gives the effect on compliers, and average treatment effects (given by the OLS estimates,
though with potential selection bias), which gives the effect on all subjects. There are a
large number of lenders who do not join any team in our sample, and the effects of our

























Effects of team membership on pro-social lending. This figure reports
the results of our two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression
coefficients (Table 4.5), indicating the effects of joining a lending team
on contributions for the 1-day (left red bar) and 7-day (middle red bar)
window. The median Kiva lender’s lifetime contributions ($25) is plotted
to provide a benchmark (green bar).
any potential endogeneity issues caused by self selection, we use the random treatment
assignment in our experiment, namely whether the lender received an email, as an
instrumental variable for joining a team. Figure 4.5 and Table 4.5 display the results
of our two-stage least squares instrumental variable regression. In the first stage,
we find that the “Email” variable, denoting whether a lender received an email, is
not a weak instrument for joining a team, with an F -statistic of 23.55. Next, for
this instrument to satisfy the exclusion restriction, it must be the case that an email
does not directly affect lending except through increasing the likelihood that a lender
joins a team. This might occur if contacting the lenders regarding Kiva reminds
them of Kiva’s existence, prompting them to lend. However, since our previous field
experiment on Kiva has shown that simply contacting the lenders does not affect
lending [32], we conclude that the instrument satisfies the exclusion restriction.
This regression employs a difference-in-differences approach. For three different
window sizes, the dependent variable in each second-stage regression is the difference
in total loan amounts t days before and after our treatment, where t is the window
63
size. Thus, the coefficients on the “Join Team” variable indicate how much more
lenders who join teams give than those who do not join teams after the treatment,
controlling for the same difference before the treatment. The results of this regression
show that joining a team significantly increases lending. However, it is important to
note that since these estimates are derived from an instrumental variables regression,
they give the local average treatment effect, not the average treatment effect [65].
Therefore, the estimates apply only to lenders who would join a team if prompted by
an email.
This effect is also insignificant beyond one week. One possible reason for the
lack of an observed long-term effect is that lenders may wait until initial loans are
repaid before lending again, a process which may take 12-18 months. However, even
the one-week effect ($392) is more than fifteen times the lifetime contribution of the
median Kiva lender ($25), indicating that team membership is effective in increasing
member contributions on those lenders who would join a team because of our email.
4.5 Discussion
This paper reports the results of a large-scale field experiment designed to test the
hypothesis that team membership can increase participation and lending for an online
crowdlending community, Kiva. We find that emails increase the likelihood that a
lender joins a team, and that joining a team increases lending in an one-week window
following the decision to join. While this experiment does not explore the mechanism
through which joining a team increases giving, our prior empirical analyses and field
experiment point to two mechanisms at work [32]. First, joining a team increases
information sharing about specific borrowers on the team forum, which reduces team
members’ search costs and increases their lending. Second, joining a team increases
the pressure to help improve the team’s ranking on the Kiva leaderboard. There-
fore, effective teams share information and coordinate their loans to reduce search
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costs, and emphasize team competition through goal setting. Our results suggest
that recommending teams to members of an online lending community based on ho-




Putting Organization into the Gig Economy: A
Field Experiment at a Ride-sharing Platform
The gig economy provides workers with the benefits of autonomy and flexibility,
but it does so at the expense of work identity and co-worker bonds. These sacrifices
make gig workers less productive and more likely to leave. In this study, we examine
the effect of team formation on the productivity of drivers at a ride-sharing platform.
Specifically, we use social identity theory to develop a team formation and inter-
team contest field experiment at DiDi, the dominant ride-sharing platform in China.
In our study, we assign drivers to teams either randomly or based on homophily
in age, hometown location, or productivity, and we have these teams compete for
cash prizes. Our results show that platform designers can leverage team identity to
increase productivity in a gig economy, especially when teams are formed to facilitate
member communication.
Compared with the previous two chapters, we do not have the empirical data to
support causal discoveries. Nor do we have behavior data to build a recommender
system with machine learning algorithms. Instead, we start directly from the third




As trends in work sourcing move us toward a gig economy, this economy is widely
considered to be the future face of work, despite questions about its sustainability.
While workers in traditional sectors derive their identities from their work and share
their experiences with co-workers, those whose livelihood relies on the gig economy
often find that “these are jobs that don’t lead to anything,” citing a lack of work
identity and bonds with co-workers as well as an inability to move upward based on
strong performance (The New Yorker, May 15, 2017).
To analyze these and other concerns associated with the gig economy, we apply
social identity theory [3] to a large online platform, Didi Chuxing (DiDi henchforce),
where individual drivers offer ride sharing in China. Specifically, we design a field
experiment to study team formation and inter-team competition within DiDi. In our
experiment, we examine how the creation of an organization identity impacts driver
productivity. Furthermore, since DiDi is a flat organization with no group structure,
we are also able to investigate how different team formations impact team member
communication and productivity.
Our research applies insights from identity economics [3, 4]. This research shows
that, when people feel a stronger sense of common identity with a group, they exert
more effort and make more contributions to public goods to reach a more efficient
outcome [51, 31]. Applying this theoretical framework to our setting, we anticipate
that a driver who has a strong sense of team identity will work harder to help his
team get ahead compared to drivers who do not belong to any team.
In examing how different team formations may have different effects on commu-
nication and coordination, we use an algorithm that maximizes either similarity or
diversity within a team. We conjecture that similarity might facilitate team member
communication and coordination, leading to intra-team bonding and team stability
[103, 120, 71]. Indeed, empirical network science studies provide evidence for ho-
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mophily, or the tendency of people to associate with others whom they perceive as
similar to themselves in some way [88, 56]. By contrast, we conjecture that diversity
might bolster team performance, due to different perspectives in problem-solving and
better complementarity among team members [74].
In addition to examining different team formation strategies, we draw on insights
from contest theory to explore how team identities form [73]. In our experiment, we
apply a theoretical model of team contests with multiple pairwise battles by having
subjects engage in inter-team contests for cash prizes, which have been shown to be
among the most effective ways to strengthen team identity [51, 54].
Lastly, our work contributes to the rapidly growing literature on the ride-sharing
economy, which has uncovered important insights related to labor market outcomes
[58], consumer surplus [39], and decentralized dynamic matching efficiency [81]. Our
findings contribute to this stream of research by showing that a team-based approach
can significantly improve driver productivity.
5.2 Experiment Design
To test the effectiveness of team formation and inter-team competition on produc-
tivity, we design a multistage natural field experiment using the ride-sharing platform
DiDi.
Recruitment stage: We conduct our experiment in the southern city of Dongguan,
China. We begin with 480,000 DiDi drivers registered in the city of Dongguan.
We first apply a set of eligibility criteria for participation in our study to satisfy a
minimum threshold of activities in the two weeks prior to the start of the experiment,
yielding 29,384 eligible drivers. From this group, we randomly choose 24,000 to
invite to participate in our experiment. From the invited group, 2,343 drivers accept
our invitation, with 531 of these indicating interest in being a team captain. We
then randomly place our invitation respondents into five treatment and one control
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condition, each consisting of 350 drivers. The remaining 283 drivers serve as backups
in case drivers in the treatments drop out before the start of the contest (for details,
see Section 5.5).
Team formation stage: In each treatment condition, we partition the 350 drivers into
teams of 7. Based on findings on team formation from previous studies [1], we select
five dimensions by which to form our teams: hometown similarity, age similarity,
productivity similarity, productivity diversity, and random formation.
Our first dimension, hometown similarity, is based on previous findings that loca-
tion similarity is the most effective characteristic in getting a microfinance community
member to join a specific lending team [1]. In our study, we use hometown similarity,
a form of location similarity, assigning drivers from the same (or a nearby) province
to the same team. Our second dimension, age similarity, is based on prior research
illustrating the importance of good communication for teams to be sustainable [32].
We conjecture that people of a similar age might find it easier to communicate and
thus form our age-similarity teams to reflect an age span of 5-10 years. Third, we
include productivity similarity as one of our strategies as it is the preferred team
formation strategy by the platform. Finally, we draw on recent scholarly research
supporting the advantages of diversity [95]. and use two strategies to create diverse
teams. To achieve productivity diversity in our teams, we partition drivers into seven
buckets based on their productivity in the two weeks prior to the announcement of
the team contest. Each team consists of drivers from all seven buckets. Our final
strategy, random formation, reflects the diversity achieved from a random grouping
of drivers. Details of our team formation algorithms are relegated to SI. In sum, our
team formation strategy yields a total of 1,750 treatment drivers formed into 250
teams, with 50 teams in each treatment.
Within each team, we identify a team captain who is notified of this position,
given the phone number of each team member, and asked to complete a survey. The
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Table 5.1: Prize Structure.
Prize Structure Individual Win Team Win
Individual-Prize Treatment 30 -
Team-Prize Treatment - 30
Hybrid-Prize Treatment 15 15
This table indicates the prize that drivers get if they win the individual contests
(individual win), if their teams win a majority of the contests (team win), or both.
The prize is calculated for each contest based on the number of trips a driver makes
on that day.
survey requires captains to communicate with each driver in the team to get their
license plate numbers as well as several key pieces of demographic information (see
SI for the pre-contest survey questions and summary statistics). Meanwhile, team
members are given the captain’s phone number and told that the captain might call
them. The initial team task is designed in such a way as to nudge the captains to
initiate communication with their team members. Captains who fill in the survey
through an online form are given 100 CNY as a bonus regardless of the correctness
of their answers. If a captain submits the survey, we mark the team as responsive. In
our sample, 60.8% of our captains submit their survey.
Contest stage: Our contest rules are based on a theoretical model of team contest
[54]. Results are determined by multiple pairwise battles. Specifically, we set up a
contest where drivers from two rival teams form pairwise matches to fight distinct
component battles. In this contest, a team wins if and only if its players win a majority
of their battles. In the theoretical model, each driver receives a private reward from
winning her own battle as well as the benefits from their team’s winning. Under
these contest rules, we obtain the desirable neutrality results, that is, the outcome is
history, sequence, and temporal-structure independent.
In our experiment, we decompose the effects into individual, team, and hybrid
prize allocation conditions, as illustrated in Table 5.1. Under the individual prize
condition, the driver who wins the contest receives a 30 CNY prize, regardless of
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team performance. Under the team prize condition, each driver in a team that wins a
majority (4 or more) of its contests receives a 30 CNY prize. Under the hybrid prize
condition, drivers receive both individual and team prizes of 15 CNY each. The prizes
are set such that the expected reward per driver remains the same across treatments,
which is 15 yuan under the symmetry assumption.
In our ride-sharing context, since we are conducting a field experiment, our drivers
also earn piece rate in addition to any prize money. This differs from the theoretical
model, where incentives come solely from prizes. To determine our pairwise match-
ing, we sort the 250 teams decreasingly by productivity (the sum of the individual
productivity of team members) in the two weeks prior to the announcement of the
contest. From the groupings of most to least productive teams, two adjacent teams are
paired for each contest, independent of their team formation strategy. This matching
process ensures that each pair of teams in each contest is as similar as possible, pre-
serving the symmetry assumption from the theoretical model. We randomly assign
each team-pair into one of three prize allocation conditions with equal probability.
Finally, within each team, we use an algorithm to automatically pair drivers by their
productivity, i.e., the most productive driver in team A competes with the most pro-
ductive one in team B, and so on. The drivers compete on the number of trips they
finish in one day of competition.
The contest was implemented between August 13 - 21, 2017, with one day off
between every two contest days. Before each contest day, we reset the contest and
repeat it five times with the same pairing of teams. The contest results are calculated
at the end of each contest day and communicated to each driver on the following day.
Figure 5.1 describes the experimental process.
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Eligible drivers (28,394)







































Figure 5.1: Experimental Procedure
5.3 Results
In this section, we present the results from our field experiment. We first examine
the effect of our contest on overall driver productivity. We then examine our results
related to the impact of team formation on team communication and performance.
Finally, we end with a discussion of the effect of leadership experience through our
results regarding team captain assignments.
We first investigate the average treatment effect, i.e., the effects of team contest
on driver productivity. Figure 5.2 presents our results for driver productivity be-
fore, during, and after the contest period by experimental condition. The top panel
presents the comparison across three experimental conditions: drivers who were never
contacted (no contact, light dashed line), those who expressed interest but were not
assigned to a team (control, black dashed line), and those who were assigned to a team















































Figure 5.2: Driver Productivity Before, During, and After the Contest.
Driver productivity is measured in average daily revenue. Contest Days refer to
August 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21, the dates on which the contests were conducted. We
shift the dates by -14, +14, and +28 days to obtain the Pre-Contest, Post-Contest,
and 4-week Post-Contest periods. Note that driver productivity is calculated only
on the 5 days in each period accordingly. In the upper panel, drivers in the No
Contact group are those who meet our criteria but are not randomly selected to
receive an invitation to participate in our experiment. Drivers in the Treatment
group are those who sign up for the experiment and are assigned to a team. Drivers
in the Control group are those who sign up for the experiment but are not assigned
to a team or participate in the contest. In the lower panel, we break drivers in the
Treatment group into Responsive versus Non-responsive teams based on whether the
team captain submits the survey.
those in responsive (solid orange line) versus non-responsive (blue dashed line) teams.
We refer to the five days of our inter-team contest as contest days and the 14 days
prior to (post) the contest as the pre- (post-) contest periods. Finally, to investigate
whether our effects last more than two weeks, we create a the 4-week post-contest
period. Our choice of windows ensures that we always compare the same day of the
week pre-contest, contest and post-contest. During our experiment, we record daily
data on each driver including the number of completed trips, the number of hours
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worked, and the revenue generated. On the DiDi platform, drivers receive 80% of the
revenue they generate and give the remaining 20% to the platform.
Returning to Figure 5.2, we see from the upper panel that those who sign up to join
a team, regardless of whether they are assigned to a treatment or control condition,
are more productive than those who are never contacted (grey dashed line). Figure
5.2 also shows that both the control group and the no-contact group exhibit a similar
decreasing trend over the eight-week time period of our experiment, a pattern similar
to the platform’s typical attrition rate. Our results in the bottom panel of Figure 5.2
show that drivers assigned to a responsive versus a non-responsive team demonstrate
a large increase in revenue during the the contest period but a smaller increase in the
two-week post-game period.
To quantify the average and heterogeneous treatment effects on daily revenue, we
construct the following difference-in-differences models:
∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Treated + εi,t, (5.1)
∆Revenuei,t = β0 + β1 ∗ Responsive + β1 ∗ Unresponsive + εi,t, (5.2)
where ∆Revenuei,t represents the revenue increase of the t-th day in the current
period compared to the t-th day in the pre-contest period. We report the results of
these models in Table 5.2, including both the average (specifications 1-3, eq.5.1) and
heterogeneous (4-6, eq.5.2) treatment effects. Pooling drivers across all treatment
and control conditions, we find that the daily revenue increases by 35 CNY during
the contest period compared to the pre-contest period and that this effect persists
during the two-week post-contest period, albeit with half of the effect size.
Separating the results by team responsivity (specifications 4-6), we find that the
increased revenue for those in a responsive team doubles the average treatment effect,
whereas the treatment effect for unresponsive teams is not significantly different from
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Table 5.2:
Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Daily Revenue.
Difference-in-differences linear regressions. We compare each of the three
time periods with the Pre-Contest period.
Dependent variable: ∆ of Daily Revenue (CNY)
Average Treatment Effects Heterogeneous Treatment Effects











Treated 35.24∗∗∗ 17.36∗ 6.369
(9.319) (9.679) (10.09)
[0.001] [0.166] [0.68]
Responsive 56.21∗∗∗ 23.25∗∗ 9.607
(9.999) (10.12) (10.55)
[0.001] [0.066] [0.654]
Unresponsive 2.706 8.237 1.348
(10.14) (10.88) (11.23)
[0.889] [0.675] [0.905]
Constant -24.24∗∗∗ -66.96∗∗∗ -82.06∗∗∗ -24.24∗∗∗ -66.96∗∗∗ -82.06∗∗∗
(7.892) (8.844) (9.192) (7.892) (8.844) (9.193)
# Driver 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
Observations (Driver * Day) 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest (individual) level for treatment (control) conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
False discovery rate adjusted q-values are in square brackets.
zero.
We also examine our results controlling for demographics (Table 5.3) and cor-
recting for multiple hypothesis testing (false discover rate adjusted q-values reported
[5]) and find that our results persist. Finally, when we use the number of daily trips
(Table 5.4) or the number of hours worked (Table 5.5) as our dependent variable, we
find that our results again remain the same.
In our experiment, we are also interested in whether different ways of forming
teams have different effects on our results. We begin by examining the effect of team
formation on captain responsiveness. From Figure 5.3, we see that 39.2% of our
assigned captains do not submit their questionnaires during the study period. We
label these teams as our non-responsive group. To identify team cohesiveness (or
cooperativeness), we check the accuracy of the license plate information submitted
on the survey. As the DiDi platform does not contain any team communication tools,
we expect that most teams communicate by phone or WeChat,1 an expectation which
is verified by our post-experiment interviews.
1WeChat is the dominant communication app in China, which allows group communication.
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Table 5.3:
Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Daily Revenue.
Difference-in-differences linear panel regressions. We compare each of the
three time periods with the Pre-Contest period.
Dependent variable: ∆ of Daily Revenue (CNY)
Average Treatment Effects Heterogeneous Treatment Effects











Treated 35.39∗∗∗ 17.62∗ 6.308
(9.306) (9.637) (10.04)
[0.001] [0.154] [0.682]
Responsive 56.30∗∗∗ 23.37∗∗ 9.518
(9.971) (10.07) (10.49)
[0.001] [0.063] [0.634]
Unresponsive 2.900 8.700 1.320
(10.10) (10.83) (11.15)
[0.871] [0.634] [0.906]
Age 0.741 0.801 0.829∗ 0.636 0.772 0.813∗
(0.518) (0.529) (0.465) (0.505) (0.521) (0.465)
DiDi Age (yr.) 17.16∗∗∗ 18.19∗∗∗ 6.455 17.30∗∗∗ 18.23∗∗∗ 6.476
(6.606) (6.709) (6.252) (6.539) (6.711) (6.243)
Local 14.23∗ 3.998 24.99∗∗∗ 15.09∗∗ 4.234 25.12∗∗∗
(7.621) (7.833) (7.657) (7.418) (7.838) (7.680)
Male 35.42 27.18 34.82 34.92 27.04 34.74
(29.03) (29.82) (26.08) (29.44) (30.10) (26.09)
Constant -103.4∗∗∗ -138.6∗∗∗ -157.0∗∗∗ -99.57∗∗∗ -137.5∗∗∗ -156.4∗∗∗
(36.56) (36.71) (30.96) (36.71) (36.82) (31.09)
# Driver 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
Observations (Driver * Day) 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500
H0: Responsive = Unresponsive p < 0.001 p = 0.0673
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest (individual) level for treatment (control) conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
False discovery rate adjusted q-values are in square brackets.
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Figure 5.3: Team Responsiveness in Different Treatments.
Team Responsiveness is coded based on the pre-contest survey. Panel (a) codes the
responsiveness binarily, with a team deemed responsive if the captain submits the
questionnaire on team member characteristics. Panel (b) codes responsiveness based
on the number of correctly-reported license plate numbers.
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Table 5.4:
Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Daily Trips. Difference-
in-differences linear panel regressions. We compare each of the three time
periods with the Pre-Contest period.
Dependent variable: ∆ of Daily Trips
Average Treatment Effects Heterogeneous Treatment Effects











Treated 2.392∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗ 0.462
(0.513) (0.542) (0.559)
[0.001] [0.057] [0.461]
Responsive 3.493∗∗∗ 1.494∗∗∗ 0.574
(0.555) (0.567) (0.584)
[0.001] [0.026] [0.419]
Unresponsive 0.684 0.791 0.289
(0.560) (0.617) (0.627)
[0.334] [0.334] [0.646]
Constant -2.032∗∗∗ -4.408∗∗∗ -5.082∗∗∗ -2.032∗∗∗ -4.408∗∗∗ -5.082∗∗∗
(0.434) (0.493) (0.513) (0.434) (0.493) (0.513)
# Driver 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
Observations (Driver * Day) 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500
H0: Responsive = Unresponsive p < 0.001 p = 0.1343
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest (individual) level for treatment (control) conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
False discovery rate adjusted q-values are in square brackets.
Table 5.5:
Average and Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Working Hours.
Difference-in-differences linear panel regressions. We compare each of the
three time periods with the Pre-Contest period.
Dependent variable: ∆ of Daily Working Hours
Average Treatment Effects Heterogeneous Treatment Effects











Treated 0.772∗∗∗ 0.379∗ 0.134
(0.192) (0.197) (0.221)
[0.001] [0.125] [0.7]
Responsive 1.205∗∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.188
(0.207) (0.205) (0.230)
[0.001] [0.057] [0.623]
Unresponsive 0.0996 0.217 0.0509
(0.207) (0.226) (0.248)
[0.71] [0.606] [0.838]
Constant -0.521∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗∗ -1.225∗∗∗ -0.521∗∗∗ -1.579∗∗∗ -1.225∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.180) (0.203) (0.162) (0.180) (0.203)
# Driver 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100 2,100
Observations (Driver * Day) 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500 10,500
H0: Responsive = Unresponsive p < 0.001 p = 0.1148
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest (individual) level for treatment (control) conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
False discovery rate adjusted q-values are in square brackets.
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Table 5.6:
Treatment Effects on Team Responsiveness. The extensive margin mea-
sures whether the team captain submits the questionnaire, reporting the
average marginal effects of Probit estimates. The intensive margin mea-
sures the number of license plates reported correctly. The omitted group
is Productivity Similarity.
Extensive margin Intensive margin
Probit, Y = P (Response) OLS, Y = #Correct Plates — Response
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age Similarity 0 -0.00323 0.429 0.327
(0.0952) (0.0964) (0.404) (0.412)
Hometown Similarity 0.186∗ 0.191∗∗ 0.437 0.403
(0.0967) (0.0967) (0.378) (0.382)
Productivity Diversity 0.0387 0.0304 0.431 0.358
(0.0954) (0.0956) (0.397) (0.402)
Random 0.0193 0.00728 0.326 0.265
(0.0953) (0.0957) (0.400) (0.405)












Observations (# teams) 250 250 152 152
H0: Hometown Similarity = Age Similarity p=0.0542 p=0.0455
[0.079] [0.079]
H0: Hometown Similarity = Random p=0.0862 p=0.0586
[0.087] [0.079]
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
False discovery rate adjusted q-values are in square brackets.
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Examining the results in Figure 5.3, we find that those teams based on hometown
similarity are more responsive than other team formations. This result is consistent
with prior research that shows that location similarity is a strong predictor of whether
a member of an online community joins a team [1]. In Table 5.6, we present the
results of our regression analyses. Specifications (1) and (2) use a Probit regression
to examine the treatment effect along the extensive margin, with the likelihood of
submitting the survey as the dependent variable. By contrast, specifications (3)
and (4) use an OLS regression to examine the treatment effect along the intensive
margin, with the number of license plates reported correctly as the dependent variable.
The results in Table 2 again show that teams based on hometown similarity show
the highest level of responsiveness. Quantitatively, these teams are 19% more likely
to be responsive than age-similar teams, productivity-similar teams, or randomly-
composed teams (significant at the 0.1 level), an effect that persists after controlling
for demographics. Along the intensive margin, however, we do not find any significant
differences among the teams which submitted the survey. One possible reason for
this finding may be that the captains decide to submit their surveys only if they have
sufficient information. Indeed, most captains who submit the survey get 6 or 5 plate
numbers (43.4%, 31.6%) correct.
Pr(Responsivenessi) = Φ(B · Treatmenti + Γ ·Demographicsi + εi) (5.3)
#Correct-Platesi = B · Treatmenti + Γ ·Demographicsi + εi (5.4)
In addition to our findings on team formation and responsiveness, we are also
interested in whether the type of team has an effect on driver productivity. Table 5.7
presents our results using team formation strategy as the independent variables in
specifications 1-3 and team diversity as the independent variables in specifications
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Table 5.7:
Similarity and Diversity on Driver Productivity. DID regressions on drivers
who belong to a team. Dependent variable: Difference in driver productiv-
ity (compared with the pre-contest time window). For (1-3), the omitted
category is the Random treatment.
Dependent variable: ∆ Daily Revenue (CNY)
By Treatment Group By Diversity Metrics











Age Similarity 0.933 33.19∗∗ 9.806
(16.91) (12.70) (11.05)
Hometown Similarity 5.838 20.70 17.12
(18.35) (13.16) (13.62)
Productivity Similarity -14.65 21.47∗ 13.85
(17.15) (12.04) (12.67)
Productivity Diversity -17.50 17.50 11.33
(15.62) (12.25) (13.09)
Age Std. -0.417 -3.357∗∗ -0.123
(1.647) (1.346) (1.279)
Avg. Hometown Distance 0.0297 -0.00706 -0.0196
(0.0242) (0.0227) (0.0203)
Productivity Std. 0.0953 -0.0347 -0.00401
(0.122) (0.0882) (0.0961)
DiDi Age Std. -0.0646 -0.0370 -0.0852
(0.0914) (0.0852) (0.0799)
Constant 16.07 -68.17∗∗∗ -86.12∗∗∗ 4.701 -15.89 -48.15∗∗
(13.69) (9.377) (8.566) (29.68) (21.04) (22.52)
# Driver 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750
Observations 8,750 8,750 8,750 8,750 8,750 8,750
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest (individual) level for treatment (control)
conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4-6. More specifically, we measure driver diversity based on driver age, productivity,
and DiDi age with their standard deviation within a team; we measure hometown
diversity using the average distance (km) between any two drivers within the same
team. Our results in Table 5.7 show that, irrespective of our independent variables,
team formation has no significant effect on driver productivity either during (Con-
test) or long after (4-week Post-Contest) the contest. Interestingly, though, we find
that teams based on age similarity exhibit significantly higher revenue immediately
after (2-week Post-Contest) the contest, earning 33 CNY on average compared with
drivers in randomly-formed teams (specification 2). This observation is confirmed
by the negative correlation between age standard deviation and team productivity
(specification 5).
Finally, we are interested in the productivity of those who volunteer to be captains
in our study. Our results in Table 5.8 (in SI) show that those who had been more
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Table 5.8:
Team Captain Volunteers. Probit estimates. Reported results are average
marginal effects. We include all drivers who signed up for the competition.
Dependent Variable
Volunteering to be Captain








DiDi Age (years) 0.0297∗∗
(0.0150)
# Drivers 2,343
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 5.9:
Effect of Being Appointed as a Captain: Difference-in-differences linear re-
gressions. Dependent variable: Difference of driver productivity (compared
with the pre-contest time window). Subjects are drivers who volunteer to
be captains and are assigned to teams which have multiple volunteers.
Note that only one volunteer in each team is randomly selected to be the
captain. Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests find no significant difference in prior
productivity, age, DiDi age, or gender between the the selected captains
and other volunteers (p > 0.1).







Assigned Captain 34.181∗ 23.647 -5.278
(19.534) (19.673) (18.624)
Constant -17.910∗ -57.146∗∗∗ -65.077∗∗∗
(12.589) (13.759) (14.707)
# Volunteers 298 298 298
Obs. 1,490 1,490 1,490
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the contest
(individual) level for treatment (control) conditions.
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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productive in the month prior to our experiment, as well as those who had been on
DiDi for a longer period of time (i.e., their DiDi age), were significantly more likely
to volunteer to lead. In 141 teams with two or more drivers who express interests in
being a captain, only one in each team is randomly appointed as the team captain.
OLS regressions show that among our base of 298 volunteers, those who are randomly
chosen to be captains are more active than those who are randomized out, earning
34 CNY more per day on average (p < 0.1) during contest days (Table 5.9 in SI),
although this result is marginally significant.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
Our study uses a field experiment at a ride-sharing platform in China to under-
stand how team formation and other factors impact team responsiveness and driver
productivity. Applying social identity theory to the ride-sharing context, we use dif-
ferent team formation strategies to place drivers in teams and compare our treatment
and control groups on their revenue earned during a contest. Our results show that,
compared to those in the control condition, treated drivers work longer hours, com-
plete more trips, and earn higher revenue during the contest, with a much larger effect
for responsive teams who communicated more with each other prior to the inter-team
contest. Overall, we find that our treated drivers earn a 12.5% higher revenue than
those in the control group. Furthermore, we find that drivers in responsive teams
as well as those in teams comprised of drivers with similar age continue to be more
productive during the two weeks after the contest, absent of any cash prize or formal
team structure.
We conclude with a few observations on how our experiment was perceived by
our subjects. Our post-contest survey (see SI) and interviews indicate that over 88%
of the drivers like or extremely like the team contest, citing team belonging (66%),
making friends (70%), a sense of honor from winning (61%), and monetary incentives
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(68%) as the top benefits. Encouraged by the results of our experiment, DiDi shipped
our team-formation algorithms into production within their platform. In 2018 alone,
DiDi conducted 1,548 inter-team contests across 180 cities in China, involving over
two million drivers. These contests, typically one-week long, helped the platform to
meet high demand from tourists during national holidays, and increased both driver
income as well as DiDi’s profits. While our experiment examines the effect of team
formation on one platform, our results indicate that team identity shows great promise
as a design tool that can be leveraged to increase worker productivity in the modern
gig economy. Future research could use our study as a foundation for exploring the




We select our pool of drivers based on their productivity in a two-week period
(July 18th, 2017 to July 31th, 2017). In addition to other requirements (e.g. the
driver is not affiliated with a rental company), we use the following criteria to filter
the drivers:
• The driver is registered in Dongguan.
• The driver has worked (finished one or more trips) on at least 5 weekdays and
2 weekend days during the two-week period.
• The driver finishes 5 or more trips on average on the days she works during the
two-week period.
This filtering process yields a total of 28,394 eligible drivers. From this pool, we
randomly selected 24,000 drivers to receive a treatment assignment invitation. The
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remaining 4,398 drivers comprise our no-contact control group. In each treatment
invitation, we ask if the driver would like to sign up for “a team competition” that
earns up to 1,000 CNY for the team. Additionally, we ask if a driver is interested
in being a team captain, with an additional 100 CNY received upon fulfilling the
responsibilities.
Our invitations received 2,343 positive responses, 531 of which were interested in
being a team captain. For our experiment, we divide our positive responses into 3
sets.
• Set 1 includes 1,750 drivers and constitutes our treatment group. These drivers
are subsequently partitioned into teams of 7 (250 teams in total).
• Set 2 includes 350 drivers, constituting the placebo group. These drivers are
not placed in a team.
• Set 3 includes the remaining 243 drivers, constituting the “backup group.” If
a driver in the treatment group drops out before the competition, we replace
the drop-out driver with a similar driver in the backup group. Indeed, in our
experiment, 15 drivers were reported by their captain as not responsive or no
longer available for competition. We mark these 15 drivers as “dropouts” and
replace them with similar drivers from the backup group.
During the team formation stage, we first randomly partition the 1,750 drivers
from Set 1 into five conditions. We then group drivers in each condition into 50 teams
with the same strategy. For example, in the Similar-Hometown condition, the seven
drivers in the same team are all from the same (or a nearby) province. For each team,
we ensured that at least one member has volunteered to be a team captain.
After forming the teams, we next text each team captain the phone numbers of
the drivers in their team. We also text each team member the phone number of their
team captain. In addition, we ask team captains to fill out a questionnaire designed
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to verify team formation and provide possibilities for icebreaking communications
within the team. The questionnaire includes the following questions:
• What are the last 3 digits of the plate numbers of the team members (six blanks,
excluding the team captain’s)?
• What is the name of your team (after discussing with the team members)?
• Where is the farthest hometown (from Dongguan) of your team members?
• What is the maximum age of the team members?
In the team competition stage, each team is paired with another team of similar
productivity throughout the duration of the experiment period. We use a 3×2 design
to vary the prize structure and in-team coordination. For the prize structure, drivers
earn monetary awards based on their individual performance, team performance, or
both. Along the coordination axis, we either use a system to determine their position
for the next game day, or we allow teams to adjust their own positions. Since they
do not affect our major outcome, we eliminate them in the analysis.
5.5.2 Power Analysis
To determine the number of drivers needed in our experiment, we conduct a pilot
experiment in a different city and find that drivers who are willing to participate in
a team contest complete 11.7 orders on average per day (std. 4.7). Since we expect
an effect size of 10%, with α = 0.05 and 0.9 power, this requires us to have 170
drivers per treatment. If we assume that 50% drivers who sign up for the experiment
will complete the experiment, we need 340 drivers per treatment. This leads us to
selecting a subject pool of 350 drivers per treatment.
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5.5.3 Survey Response
The response rate is 577/1750=33%. The number and percent of drivers choosing
a certain choice are indicated in the bracket.
1. Did you participate in the team contest in XXX city from XX to XX?
(a) Yes. (99.%)
(b) I am not sure. (1%)
2. To what degree did you enjoy this team contest? Please rate on the scale below






3. Why do you like this team contest? Please select all that apply. (Limited to
the 508 drivers who chose 4 or 5 in Q2.
(a) I had a sense of team belonging. (337, 66.3%)
(b) The contest was interesting and thrilling. (241, 47.4%)
(c) I was able to make more friends. (334, 65.7%)
(d) Winning the contest gave me a sense of honor. (310, 61.0%)
(e) I got a monetary bonus. (347, 68.3%)
(f) Other reasons, please specify: (20, 3.9%)
4. Why did you dislike the team contest? Please select all that apply. (Limited to
the 69 drivers who chose 1, 2, or 3 in Q2.)
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(a) The team members were not collaborative or united enough. (30, 43.5%)
(b) The team was not active enough to justify existence. (42, 60.9%)
(c) The leader didn’t have good leadership and management skills. (31, 44.9%)
(d) The contest rules were too complicated for me to understand. (4, 5.8%)
(e) The contest rules were unfair. (10, 14.5%)
(f) The monetary bonus was not large enough to attract me. (38, 55.1%)
(g) Other reasons, please specify: (9, 13.0%)
5. As a team [member/captain] , how did you benefit from this team contest?
Select all that apply.
(a) I made more friends. (405, 70.2%)
(b) I improved my leadership skills. (only for captains, 82, 68.9% among cap-
tains)
(c) I improved my communication skills. (278, 48.2%)
(d) I improved my collaboration skills with other drivers. (342, 59.3%)
(e) I became more experienced and skillful about taking the DiDi orders. (300,
52.0%)
(f) I received consolation from my teammates when I was down. (191, 33.1%)
(g) Other reasons, please specify. (33, 5.7%)
6. Which of the rules in this contest do you like? Please select all that apply.
(a) There was one day off between every two contest days. (270, 46.8%)
(b) The score was announced immediately after each contest day. (315, 54.6%)
(c) There were both driver-level and team-level competition. (402, 69.7%)
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(d) The team could discuss and decide the lineup together. (66, 31.6% among
the 209 applicable participants)
(e) The lineup changed between contest days. (195, 33.8%)
(f) Other reasons, please specify: (7, 1.2%)
(g) None (22, 3.8%)
7. How did your team do in this contest? Please select all that apply
(a) Although each team member was different, we all got along well. (307,
53.2%)
(b) Our team shared commonalities and common topics. (268, 46.4%)
(c) Everyone contributed to our team’s honor during the contest. (398, 69.0%)
(d) Inactive team members influenced others’ enthusiasm for the contest. (186,
32.2%)
8. What would you choose if you participate the contest again?
(a) I would choose to be a team member. (359, 62.2%)
(b) I would choose to be a team captain. (158, 27.4%)
(c) I haven’t decided. (60, 10.4%)
9. Why did you prefer NOT to be a team captain? (Applicable only to drivers
who chose to be team member in Q8.)
(a) I didn’t want to initiate communication with strangers. (12, 5.5%)
(b) I didn’t know how to lead a team. (90, 41.3%)
(c) The extra bonus for team captains was not enough. (28, 12.8%)
(d) Team captains required too much extra work. (54, 24.8%)
88
(e) I am inexperienced with team management and I need more practice. (130,
59.6%)
(f) Other reasons, please specify: (12, 5.5%)
10. What do you think a team captain should do?
(a) Lead by example. (409, 70.9%)
(b) Be positive and energetic. (379, 65.7%)
(c) Help teammates be more active. (416, 72.1%)
(d) Help the team to win the contest. (372, 64.5%)
(e) Represent team members with feedback and suggestions to the DiDi plat-
form. (329, 57.0%)
(f) Other reasons, please specify: (12, 2.1%)
11. How did you prefer to join team?
(a) I preferred to join the WeChat group of my team and communicate with
other teammates online. (71, 12.3%)
(b) I preferred to call others and ask to join their team. (316, 54.8%)
(c) I preferred to wait for a phone-call invitation to join the team. (186, 32.2%)
(d) Other reasons, please specify: (4, 0.7%)
12. Which of the following teams would you prefer?
(a) Temporary teams, so that I can join different teams for each contest. (116,
20.1%)
(b) A long-lasting team, and team members keep in touch after the contest.
(461, 79.9%)
13. Which of the following team structures would you prefer?
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(a) I prefer to have a captain and different roles among team members. (162,
28.1%)
(b) I don’t care if there is a team captain, as long as all teammates can work
hard together. (412, 71.4%)
(c) Others, please specify: (3, 0.5%)




This dissertation is broadly aligned with data science for social good, which applies
data science to address real-world challenges for societal benefit. In many cases, social
good can be achieved simply through a bottom-up effort if individuals adopt pro-social
behaviors.
However, persuading users to adopt pro-social behaviors is hard, especially when
there isn’t a clear or immediate incentive to do so. Instead of enforcing policies, we
seek to use so-called nudge behavior mechanisms, which have demonstrated effective-
ness in several applications. Specifically, this dissertation seeks to better nudge with
an end-to-end data science pipeline.
Ideally, this pipeline includes three interrelated stages: (1) finding, (2) implement-
ing, (3) and evaluating a nudge, all conducted in a data-driven approach, especially
with the joint forces of causal inference and machine learning. Below, we layout the
ideal setup of the three stages, and map them to the three application scenarios de-
scribed in Chapters III to V. Note that some of the works mentioned below may not
have been done for this dissertation. Either they have been done in previous stud-
ies, or they are not immediately feasible and thus planned as future work. Yet this
does not render the projects incomplete but instead highlights the flexibility of our
proposed pipeline.
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• Causal inference, with the help from machine learning, can be used on user-
behavioral data, collected either from data records or from randomized experi-
ments, to reveal causal insights about potential nudges for pro-social behavior:
On GitHub, we identify using emoji as the nudge to more participation and
effort in resolving issues; On Kiva and DiDi, we identify joining teams as the
nudge to higher contributions or productivity.
• Recommender systems provide personalized suggestions for each individual. By
providing the users with more relevant choices, the recommender systems max-
imize the effect of the identified nudge and increase the adoption of pro-social
behaviors. On GitHub, such a recommender system would recommend the
emoji that the users are most likely to use in submitting an issue. On Kiva and
DiDi, the recommender system would recommend the teams that the drivers
are more likely to join.
• Finally, randomized field experiments put the recommender systems into prac-
tice and evaluate them in real-world contexts. On GitHub, this would test the
emoji recommender system as to how the recommendations are accepted and
whether the increased usage of emoji (if any), triggers more attention and par-
ticipation. On Kiva and DiDi, they would see if users are more likely to join
teams and become more active.
It should also be noted that output from the last stage could also serve as input
to the first stage, initializing a new iteration of the pipeline.
6.1 Implications
The proposed end-to-end pipeline presents implications to audiences in several
different disciplinaries:
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• For the machine learning audience, the causal questions raised in the pipeline,
that is predicting the causal effect of a treatment, substantially change the
setup of supervised machine learning. The outcome variable to be predicted,
the causal effect, can never be truly observed, as it requires comparison with a
counterfactual outcome. One should be aware that the valid estimate of causal
effect requires different assumptions associated with causal inference techniques.
In most cases, there are assumptions that cannot be fully justified with data or
metrics.
• For causal inference researchers, the power of machine learning to handle large
and complex data sets extends the ability to make previously impossible causal
conclusions. Not only can we apply off-the-shelf machine learning algorithms
to extract features from images, texts, or other complex data types, but we can
also adapt machine learning algorithms to existing identification strategoies and
estimate both average treatment effects and heterogeneous treatment effects.
Note that the latter application usually requires modifying existing algorithms
to provide valid confidence intervals for the estimation. One should be aware
that machine learning models are all “data-driven,” and frequently use cross-
validation for model selection and parameter tuning.
• For domain practitioners, our proposed pipeline provides a principled way to in-
tegrate domain knowledge with advanced data science techniques. Such domain
knowledge could be developed theory in literature, conclusions drawn from pre-
vious studies, or heuristics based on daily practices. In the first stage, domain
knowledge provides the initial hypothesis of the potential nudges, which can be
tested on real-world data. In the second stage, we rely on domain knowledge
for useful features that help improve the performance of the recommender sys-




Our proposed end-to-end data science pipeline is principled and flexible. Not only
is it easy to apply on different platforms, it is also easy to extend existing explorations
further down the pipeline. In the last part of this dissertation, we outline a few
extensions for the three applications described in the early chapters, and detail a few
additional applications.
Promote Developer Participation with Emoji Our exploration of GitHub
started at the first stage. With propensity score matching, we successfully identi-
fied emoji as potential means to promote developer participation. The immediate
next stage is to develop an emoji recommender system to encourage the use of emoji
on the platform. In fact, we have already seen efforts from GitHub to ease the typ-
ing of emoji. For example, GitHub’s online editor already supports transforming the
:emoji_alias: formatted emoji aliases into emoji characters. For example, by typ-
ing :+1:, the interface would immediately suggest for the user to click and insert
into the text.
Team Recommendation on Kiva In a sense, our study on team recommenda-
tions on Kiva has already gone through an entire pipeline, except that the first stage
was completed in a previous study. However, if we consider the perspective of the
teams instead of the users, the Kiva users recommended to join a team would also
serve as a stimulus to the recommended team. In other words, the same set of ex-
perimental data can also be used to analyze the newcomers’ effect on teams. That
is, we are re-iterating the pipeline from the first stage. In fact, a pilot study has
revealed significant variations in team activity levels. If we conclude that an active
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newcomer would actually re-activate a dormant team, that would be a nudge to pro-
mote the lending of the Kiva users who are members of only inactive teams. Further
down the pipeline, we may adapt the team recommender system to recommend active
newcomers to inactive teams.
Team Competition on DiDi In the team competition conducted on DiDi, we used
a rule-based system to partition participants into teams, and we start at the third
stage, field experiment, on our pipeline. With the experiment data, however, we are
able to re-iterate the pipeline and build data-driven team recommender systems. Such
systems can then be used to support more field experiments on DiDi, and further the
exploration of the driver team mechanism. We envision two potential future projects
with the help of the renovated team recommender system: First, we may extend the
team identity to beyond the short-term competition and study how team identities
can enhance drivers’ experiences in the long term. Such a study is the third stage in
the second run of the pipeline. Second, if the team recommender system and the team
competition are delivered into the product, there would be many short competitions
conducted across different regions and time periods. The results from these short
competitions would enable the first stage in the third iteration of the pipeline, to
explore the heterogeneity observed among the drivers and competitions. In short, we
may well expect several loops through the end-to-end pipeline.
Aside from extensions to the current applications, we may also apply the pipeline
to other applications. Let’s use online education as an example:
End-to-end pipeline to promote student outcomes in online education Re-
cent developments in educational technology, such as MOOCs and digitized learning
content, present an unprecedented opportunity for data science and education re-
searchers: The availability of website clickstreams, forum participation, and course
content interactions creates a heterogeneous data repository to model students’ learn-
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ing behavior. In the absence of the traditional classroom, randomized experiments
can be conducted at the student level. In short, such a platform can benefit from our
pipeline in exploring effective nudges to improve student outcomes. We do note that
the scenarios present new challenges to the end-to-end pipeline: First, experiments
in education have a long cycle, and the effect of treatments won’t be observed until
the end of a course or even years after a program is completed. This challenge sets a
higher requirement for the first two stages in the pipeline: finding causal insights and
deriving robust prediction models. Second, students intrinsically have different learn-
ing paces and backgrounds, calling for advanced tools for analyzing heterogeneity in
treatment outcomes.
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